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COMMENT
IT'S A SMALL WORLD AFTER ALL: PERSONAL
JURISDICTION, THE INTERNET AND THE GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE
INTRODUCTION
Has the Internet really broadened the power of courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant? This is the question that
has recently faced courts across this country for the first time. As judges
and jurors have grappled with the difficult issues surrounding this revolu-
tionary form of communication, new and interesting patterns are emerg-
ing. As expected, the results are mixed. On the one hand, electronic con-
tacts are finally being accorded legal effect in courts around the world.
On the other hand, individuals are incurring liability in places and coun-
tries they never dreamed possible.
When the United States Department of Defense began a project to
link military computers with computer networks in industry and academia
in 1969, its creators could have hardly envisioned today's Internet.' In-
corporating such varied technologies as the World Wide Web, electronic
mail, chat rooms, video conferencing, and newsgroups, the modem day
Internet has blossomed into a powerful, global communications medium.
Yet, as this medium has reached mainstream acceptance, its users have
begun to turn to the courts to protect their "on-line" rights. As a result,
the first wave of Internet-based cases has reached the courts, announcing
the legal maturation of this medium. Not coincidentally, it has also ele-
vated the threshold legal issue of personal jurisdiction to primary
importance.
Because courts, both foreign and domestic, have set forth few con-
crete rules concerning the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on In-
ternet-related contacts, the battle has centered around two emerging mod-
els-one theoretical and one traditional. In the theoretical model, Internet
visionaries claim that interaction in "cyberspace ' 2 does not involve any
1. The Internet can best be described as an intangible network of networks intercon-
necting millions of computers around the world. See discussion of the Internet, infra
PART II.
2. See EDwARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAw: YOUR
RIGTrs AND DUTIES IN THE ON-LINE WORLD 1 (1993) (defining "cyberspace"). The term
"cyberspace" was originally coined in the early 1980's by science-fiction writer William
Gibson in his award-winning science fiction novel, Neuromancer. See id. Today, the word
(127)
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contact with the physical world and, as a result, traditional notions of
personal jurisdiction do not apply.3 Under the other model, traditionalists
note that cyberspace does not lack a physical location any more than
does the telephone system. 4 As cyberspace is really interconnected lines
and hardware based in fixed locations around the world, courts have the
power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a cyberspace-based action in
the same manner as it would any other case.
This Comment attempts to illustrate how courts are applying ex-
isting personal jurisdiction precedent in today's electronic world. Al-
though the Internet provides a revolutionary new medium by which a
party may engage in sophisticated transactions across state and national
borders without leaving home, a new body of law is not needed to de-
cide issues of personal jurisdiction. Courts have faced and surmounted
similar obstacles after inventions such as the telephone, radio, and televi-
sion. While the Internet may pose novel questions with regard to the me-
dium used to connect to a jurisdiction, fundamental fairness to the
defendant remains the guiding principle in any personal jurisdiction anal-
ysis, foreign or domestic.5
"cyberspace" more commonly refers to the collection of on-line virtual communities as a
whole. See William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Prece-
dent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 199 n.5 (1995) ("s com-
monly used today, cyberspace is the conceptual 'location' of the electronic interactivity
available using one's computer.").
3. See David R. Johnston & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370-71 (1996) ("Cyberspace has no territorially
based boundaries, because the cost and speed of message transmission on the Net is al-
most entirely independent of physical location. Messages can be transmitted from one
physical location to any other location . . . without any physical cues or barriers that
might otherwise keep geographically remote places and people separate from one an-
other."); see also Byassee, supra note 2, at 198 n.5 ("Cyberspace is a place 'without
physical walls or even physical dimensions' in which interaction occurs as if it happened
in the real world and in real time, but constitutes only a 'virtual reality.' " (quoting Law-
rence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the Electronic
Frontier, THE HUMANIST, Mar. 26, 1991, at 15)).
4. See Byassee, supra note 2, at 199 (stating that although cyberspace transcends ge-
ographical boundaries, "it cannot exist independently of the real world"); see also Erik J.
Heels & Richard P. Klau, Let's Make a Few Things Perfectly Clear: Cyberspace, the In-
ternet, and That Superhighway, STUDENT LAWYER, May 1995, at 17 ("Never forget that
the Internet is simply a bunch of interconnected wires, with computers at the ends of the
wires, and with people in front of the computers.").
5. In the United States, the Due Process Clause provides the outermost limits for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. For the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants, reasonableness is the guiding standard under
the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. For a more
detailed discussion, refer to Part III [A], infra.
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In the United States, the Supreme Court's 1945 decision in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington6 ushered in the modem era with regard to
the personal jurisdiction analysis. The International Shoe Court recog-
nized that advances in communications, travel, and commerce were put-
ting immense pressure on the old territorial notion of personal jurisdic-
tion articulated most famously by the Court in Pennoyer v. Neff.' In
International Shoe, the Court announced a new standard for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction in the United States. This standard foresaw the
rapid changes taking place in the country and sought to address this new
transience with a flexible standard. In addition this standard balanced the
convenience of the forum against the fairness to the defendant. Eventu-
ally, the modem personal jurisdiction analysis came to rest upon these
two prongs.
Today, those two prongs are once again in conflict. The Internet, in
all its forms, permits a user, for a minimal investment, to literally broad-
cast his or her message to the entire world. This property has meant rev-
olutionary changes for communication as well as commerce. But there
has been a price. Although more people can now communicate and
purchase goods and services electronically, more people can now be in-
jured electronically as well. The causes of action have not changed, only
the medium has changed. And that is where we find ourselves today-at
the threshold of an information revolution with only past precedent to
guide us. But as this Comment will argue, we need not abandon the ex-
isting personal jurisdiction models. In fact, those models are still viable
and need only to be adapted to the new communications medium.
This Comment will discuss the exercise of personal jurisdiction by
countries around the world based on Internet-related contacts. As there
are no concrete international standards guiding international courts other
than "reasonableness," this Comment will extrapolate from the United
States' standards. In analyzing the existing case law, this Comment will
argue that existing personal jurisdiction standards are flexible enough to
adequately protect the rights of defendants based on Internet contacts.
However, this Comment will also suggest that, when Internet-related con-
tacts are implicated, the second prong of the traditional personal jurisdic-
tion analysis, the factors of "fair play and substantial justice," will be-
come the primary consideration for courts. As a defendant can conduct
business or cause effects in a variety of distant forums with little more
than a telephone, a modem, and an Internet connection, the "minimum
contacts" prong of the due process analysis will wither. Consequently,
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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courts will analyze the bulk of Internet-related cases using "other fac-
tors" in the due process analysis.
In Part I, this Comment will describe recent incidents, both in the
United States and abroad, involving the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Part II will describe the medium known as the Internet, in all its forms,
and discuss why it is creating questions regarding the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction. Part III will describe the standards for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction, internationally and here in the United States. Part
IV discusses the existing case law regarding the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction based on Internet contacts. In Part A, the Comment will dis-
cuss how the existing distinctions between active and passive web pages
are an inadequate model for determining whether to exercise jurisdiction.
Part B divides the case law into three categories based on the holdings in
those cases. Part V discusses how the Internet is decreasing the signifi-
cance of the "minimum contacts" analysis to the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction. As defendants can now "purposefully avail" themselves of the
benefits and protections of a foreign state either inadvertently or acciden-
tally, courts must now look to the "other factors" to determine whether
the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is reasonable. Fi-
nally, in Part VI, this Comment argues that "purposeful availment" re-
mains a viable standard, even in this new electronic age. Although an
electronic posting may be received world-wide, it is still possible to con-
duct a "purely local" business on the Internet while not subjecting one-
self to jurisdiction everywhere the posting can be received.
PART I: RECENT INCIDENTS
A. Minnesota
WARNING TO ALL INTERNET USERS AND PROVIDERS
[P]ersons outside of Minnesota who transmit information via the In-
ternet knowing that information will be disseminated in Minnesota are
subject to jurisdiction in Minnesota courts for violations of state criminal
and civil laws.8
8. Warning to All Internet Users and Providers, Mem. Minn. Att'y Gen. (visited
May 14, 1999) <http://www.ag.state.mn.us/home/consumer/consumernews/OnlineScams/
memo.html> [hereinafter Minnesota Memorandum]. The assertion of jurisdiction rested on
the Minnesota general criminal statute which provides that "[a] person may be convicted
and sentenced under the law of this State if the person... (3) Being without the state,
intentionally causes a result within the state prohibited by the criminal laws of this state."
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.025 (West 1987).
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In July 1995 the Minnesota Attorney General's Office posted this
warning statement to the Internet. On July 18, 1995, Minnesota Attorney
General Hubert "Skip" Humphrey, III, announced the filing of six civil
lawsuits against Internet advertisers. 9 Proceeding under the state's con-
sumer fraud and deceptive trade-practices laws, Humphrey attacked a va-
riety of fraudulent schemes including: "credit repaid" operations, pyra-
mid schemes, and a promotion for a "miracle drug" for cancer and
AIDS. l°
Amongst the many online consumer protection actions, Attorney
General Humphrey filed suit against Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., an In-
ternet sports wagering site based in Belize." Drawing on the classic sce-
nario of international criminal jurisdiction regarding someone acting
outside the state causing effects in the state, 2 the Attorney General of
Minnesota filed the first in a series of consumer protection lawsuits.
13
Just as Minnesota could exercise jurisdiction over someone outside the
state who fired a rifle at someone in the state, the Attorney General ar-
gued in the Minnesota Memorandum, so Minnesota had the power to en-
force its laws against purveyors of online fraud.14 A Minnesota trial court
and the Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed, permitting the Attorney
General to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant based strictly
on the availability of its web site within the State. 5
B. France
In January 1997, two private French organizations filed suit against
the Georgia Institute of Technology's European campus in Metz, France
("Georgia Tech-Lorraine"). 6 The two organizations claimed that Georgia
Tech-Lorraine's web site, which advertised its French campus, violated
9. See Mark Eckenwiler, States Get Entangled in the Web, LEGAL TIMES, Janu-
ary 22, 1996, at S35.
10. See id..
11. Id.
12. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS FOR THE PROGRESSIVE CODIFICA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
(1926).
13. See Eckenwiler, supra note 9.
14. The power to enforce presupposes jurisdiction to enforce. See RESTATEMENT
(TrnD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 432 Introductory note (1987).
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]
15. State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 1996 WL 767431 (Minn. Ramsey County
Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996), aff'd, 568 N.W. 2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), aff'd by an
equally divided state supreme court, 576 N.W. 2d 747 (Minn. 1998).
16. See Tom Lander, The French Say Non to English Language Website, (visited
May 14, 1999) <http://www.wired.com/news/story/911.html>.
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Article 2 of France's Toubon Law.17 That language purity law required
French, or a French translation, be used in all advertisements for goods
or services that appeared in France. 8 This suit marked the first time the
Toubon Law was applied to the Internet. 19
The prosecutors argued that the Toubon Law applied to the Georgia
Tech-Lorraine web site because the Metz campus was incorporated and
operated under French law. 20 In addition, the Web site was accessible in
France over the Internet.21 Georgia Tech defended on the ground that the
law did not apply to the web site because it was private. The Web site
was intended for students enrolled in the Lorraine program, who were re-
quired to be fluent in English and to attend classes in English.22 As pen-
alty for violation of the Toubon Law, Georgia Tech faced fines of as
much as 25,000 francs ($4,300 US) for each time the English-only page
was accessed. 23
On June 9, 1997, the Tribunal del Police de Paris dismissed the suit
against Georgia Tech on procedural grounds.24 In particular, the court de-
clined to move forward with the prosecution because of the plaintiff's in-
itial failure to report the violations to the police, as required by law. 25 In
addition, the court concluded that prosecutions under the Toubon Law
could only be initiated by the government and not by private organiza-
tions. 26 Despite the favorable ruling, Georgia Tech has redesigned its web
17. The Toubon Law was enacted on July 1, 1994. See Law No. 94-665 of Aug. 4,
1994, Relative a l'emploi de la lengue francaise. J.O., Aug. 5, 1994 [hereinafter Toubon
Law]. Article 2 requires the use of French for the name, offer, presentation, or instruction
of goods, including any written, spoken, or audio-visual advertising. Slogans and
messages associated with registered trademarks are also encompassed by Article 2. See
Stacy Amity Feld, Language and the Globalization of the Economic Market: The Regula-
tion of Language as a Barrier to Free Trade, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.153, 167 (1998).
18. The Georgia Tech-Lorriane web site was located on a French web server and
had a French domain name: <http://www.georgiatech-metz.fr/>. See French Internet Suit
Dismissed English-Only Web Site Illegal, Groups Charge, Chicago Tribune, June 10,
1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 3557201.
19. Id. See also Tom Ladner, The French Say Non to English-Language Web Site,
(visited November 14, 1999) <http://www.wired.com/news/story/911.html>.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Chicago Tribune supra note 18.
23. See Feld, supra note 17, at 171.
24. See Chicago Tribune, supra note 18.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 171 n. 88. See also Multimedia Docket Sheet: Recent and Pending
Cases, Multimedia and Web Strategist, June 9, 1997, at 8, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, NWLTRS File. Additionally, it was reported that the suit was dismissed because
the prosecuting organization was not authorized to bring such a claim on behalf of the
government.
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site to include French translations. 27 However, it still remains to be seen
whether the French language purity law applies to the Internet.
PART II: DON'T KILL THE MESSENGER
A. The Medium
To understand why the Internet represents a challenge to the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction, one must first understand the medium. The
Internet was originally designed by the United States Department of De-
fense to operate as a nation-wide communications medium for the ex-
change of information in the event of an attack.28 Designed to be a de-
centralized, self-maintaining series of redundant links, the Internet was
capable of rapidly transmitting communications between connected com-
puters without human involvement.29 Regardless of the size of the file,
the transmission of every message occurred in the same manner.
The transmission of information occurred in a number of steps.
First, the information would be broken down into smaller packets of in-
formation, and each packet would be independently sent to a unique ad-
dress located on the network. To get to that address, the information
would travel over a series of linked computers through dedicated com-
munications lines. If any one link in the network was damaged, the infor-
mation would be re-routed until it eventually reached its unique destina-
27. See Feld, supra note 17, at 170 n.89.
28. The forerunner of the Internet was created in the summer of 1969 by the De-
partment of Defense's Advanced Research Project Agency ("DARPA"). Originally termed
the .'RPANET," this network linked defense researchers with remote computer centers,
allowing them to share hardware and software resources such as computer disk space,
databases, and computers. As the Internet continued to grow, the National Science Foun-
dation subsumed the project when it contracted with private corporations to upgrade and
expand the national network to create the National Science Foundation Network
("NSFNet"). NSFNet was intended for non-commercial use by research and educational
institutions. See TRACY LAQUEY, THE INTERNET COMPANION 3-6 (1993). For one of the
best descriptions of the Internet and its inception, see ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824
(E.D. Pa. 1996) [hereinafter ACLU]. Today an estimated 40 million people have access to
the Internet, and 60 percent of those computers are located in the United States. The gov-
ernment has speculated that the number of users will grow to 200 million by the year
1999. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831; See also Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 926
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). At least 75 countries have full Internet access, and another 77 countries
can send and receive e-mail. The Internet Affects All Areas of Modem Life, ONLINE PROD-
UCT NEWS, May 1995, available in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS File. For a com-
prehensive discussion of the Internet and its origins, see generally PETER H. SALUS, CAST-
ING THE NET (1995); Edwin Diamond & Stephen Bates, The Ancient History of the
Internet, AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1995, at 34-35.
29. See ACLU, 929 F Supp. 831.
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tion. Once at the destination, the receiving computer would automatically
re-assemble the message packets into their original order.30 Using this
method, no two parts of a single message might ever have traveled the
same route to arrive at its eventual destination.
As ARPANET grew in popularity, similar networks were developed
to link universities, research facilities, businesses, and individuals around
the world. Eventually, these networks were all linked together, allowing
users from any computer linked to any one of the networks to transmit
communications to any other user on any other linked network. This se-
ries of redundantly linked computers comprises what is commonly re-
ferred to today as the Internet.3
Today, access to the Internet is fairly simple and occurs in one of
two ways. The first type of connection occurs when individuals can use a
computer that is directly (and most likely permanently) connected to the
computer network that is connected to the Internet. This type of connec-
tion is usually found at universities, research institutions, or, increasingly,
at many large corporations. The other type of access occurs remotely,
where an individual uses a personal computer and a modem to connect
over an existing telephone line to a larger computer or computer network
that is itself directly or indirectly connected to the Internet.32 This type of
access is most commonly provided by commercial or non-commercial In-
ternet Service Providers, or ISPs. Other methods of access in this cate-
gory include the "online" service providers, such as America Online,
which provide indirect access to the Internet through their own proprie-
tary networks.
As access has become easier, the growth of the Internet has been
nothing short of explosive. According to recent estimates, "In 1981,
fewer than 300 computers were linked to the Internet, and by 1989, the
number stood at fewer than 90,000 computers. By 1993, over 1,000,000
computers were linked. Today, over 9,400,000 host computers worldwide
.... are estimated to be linked to the Internet."' 33 Some estimate that
world-wide Internet access is greater than 180 million users, with over 82
million users accessing the Internet from non-English speaking
countries.34
30. See id. at 831-32.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 832-33.
33. Id. at 831. Host computers are the computers which are permanently linked to
the Internet. The host computers do not give an actual indication as to the real number of
users because a university or a corporation might count as a single host.
34. Global Internet Statistics (by Language) (visited May 14, 1999) <http://
www.euromktg.com/globalstats/>.
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B. The Many Faces of the Internet
The Internet consistently defies categorization mainly because it is
really a generic term for a number of very different methods of commu-
nications. The most common methods of communication on the Internet
(as well as within the online services) can be roughly organized into six
categories: (1) point-to-point messaging (such as "e-mail"); (2) point-to-
multipoint messaging (such as "listserv"); (3) distributed message
databases (such as "USENET newsgroups"); (4) real time communica-
tion (such as "Internet Relay Chat" or IRC); (5) real time remote com-
puter utilization (such as "telnet"); and (6) remote information retrieval
(such as "ftp," "gopher," and the "World Wide Web"). 35
Point-to-Point Messaging-One of the most basic communications
mediums on the Internet is electronic mail, or "e-mail." In the first cate-
gory, e-mail functions much like a letter through the postal service. It is
addressed and sent to one or many unique addresses. However, unlike a
letter delivered through the postal service, e-mail is not routed through a
central control point and is not secure unless it is encrypted.
Point-to-Multipoint Messaging-In this category, an individual can
use e-mail to send a message to an automatic mailing list service, called
a "listserv." In this type of communication, an individual subscribes to a
listserv mailing list on a topic of interest. Then, a subscriber can send
messages on the topic to the listserv and that message will be forwarded,
either automatically or through a human moderator, to all members of
that list (via e-mail). There are thousands of mailing listservs on the In-
ternet, with thousands of subscribers.
Distributed Message Databases-This group of communications
functions similarly to the listserv mailing, but it operates quite differently.
Like listservs, USENET newsgroups are open discussions and exchanges
on particular topics. Unlike the listservs, however, users of the USENET
newsgroups need not subscribe to the discussion group in advance, but
can access the database at any time. When an individual with access to a
USENET server posts a message to a newsgroup, the message is auto-
matically forwarded to approximately 200,000 USENET servers around
the world.36 The message is then temporarily stored on that server where
it is available for viewing by subscribers. There are newsgroups on more
than 15,000 different subjects, and more than 100,000 new articles posted
to newsgroups each day. 37
35. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834.
36. Id. at 835.
37. Id.
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Real time communication-In addition to sending messages that can
be later read or accessed, individuals can also engage in an immediate
dialog with others in "real time." The Internet Relay Chat program, or
IRC, allows two or more people to type messages to each other, and
those messages will appear almost instantly on the other's computer
screen. IRC is analogous to a telephone party line, using a computer and
a keyboard in place of the telephone.38 Additionally, commercial online
providers, such as America Online, have their own "chat" systems, al-
lowing their members to converse.
Real time remote computer utilization-Using a program called
"telnet," individuals can access and remotely operate another computer
in "real time."
Remote information retrieval-The final major category of commu-
nication has undoubtedly become the most popular and, in some cases,
has become virtually synonymous with the term Internet. One type of
program in this category is called "ftp" (or file transfer protocol). Using
this program, an individual accesses another computer at a designated ad-
dress and the lists of files available on that remote computer. The indi-
vidual can then use the program to transfer one or more of those files to
the individual's local computer. Another type of communication in this
category is named "gopher." This program uses a unique format to guide
an individual's search through a remote computer. The third type of In-
ternet communication, and undoubtedly the most popular, is the "World
Wide Web."' 39 In this form of communication, information is stored in a
special formatting language on remote computers with their own unique
address. Individuals then access this information using a program called a
"browser." Such a document can contain text, images, sound, animation,
and video to be viewed by users on their local computer. More impor-
38. Id.
39. "[The World Wide Web] is currently the most advanced information system
deployed on the Internet." AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB INITIA-
TIVE (visited May 14, 1999) <http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/summary.html>. The infor-
mation contained in these documents, called "Web pages," can be stored in different for-
mats such as text, sound, graphics, or video. Each Web page has its own "address"
indicating on which "server" computer the page is stored. Web pages often contain
"links," which are highlighted sections of text or images that refer to a related Web
page. See id. When a person viewing the Web page "clicks" on the link (or selects the
link with a mouse), the browser automatically contacts the server upon which the selected
page is stored and allows the user to view the linked Web page. See id. The World Wide
Web is the creation of a European think tank, Conseil European pour la Recherche
Nucleaire ("CERN") made up of computer scientists, for the purpose of facilitating the
work of physics researchers. Bryan Pfaffenberger, PUBLISH IT ON THE WEB 32-33 (1996).
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tantly, this information is available to a person with access to the Internet
at any time, day or night, during any day of the year.
Increasingly, these web documents have become very sophisticated.
In fact, the author of a web page can program a particular link to auto-
matically execute instructions when accessed. These instructions may in-
clude executing a search on a defined database, compiling information
and mailing it to a user, or even conducting a commercial transaction. It
is these complex activities, in particular, which are causing courts great
consternation with regard to personal jurisdiction.
C. Why the Internet is Unbalancing the Personal Jurisdiction
Analysis
As one might expect, commentators and practitioners who have been
watching the development of the Internet fall into two distinct camps
with regard to the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on Internet-
related contacts-the theorists and the realists. Some theorists have ar-
gued that the Internet raises unique questions about the proper forum for
an electronic contact because such contacts occur in "cyberspace." As
electronic contacts over the Internet do not involve any contact with the
physical world, they argue, traditional notions of personal jurisdiction do
not apply.4° These theorists argue that an entirely new set of rules, based
entirely on the type of contacts that occur over the Internet, is needed to
bridge this gap.4' Understandably, such arguments have fallen on deaf
ears as courts around the world have begun to move forward with claims
resulting from Internet-related contacts.
Other theorists have more correctly noted that the Internet does not
lack a physical location any more than does the telephone system.42 The
40. See Johnston & Post, supra note 2 at 1370-71 ("Cyberspace has no territorially
based boundaries, because the cost and speed of message transmission on the Net is al-
most entirely independent of physical location. Messages can be transmitted from one
physical location to any other location ...without any physical cues or barriers that
might otherwise keep geographically remote places and people separate from one an-
other."); see also Byassee, supra note 2, at 198 n.5 ("Cyberspace is a place 'without
physical walls or even physical dimensions' in which interaction occurs as if it happened
in the real world and in real time, but constitutes only a 'virtual reality." (quoting Law-
rence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the Electronic
Frontier, THE HUMANIST, Mar. 26, 1991, at 15)).
41. See Johnston & Post, supra note 3, at 1400-02 (arguing that "cyberspace" has
created new spaces without territorial boundaries in which a distinct set of rules applies).
42. See Byassee, supra note 2, at 199 (stating that although cyberspace transcends
geographical boundaries, "it cannot exist independently of the real world"); see also Erik
J. Heels & Richard P. Klau, Let's Make a Few Things Perfectly Clear: Cyberspace, the
Internet, and That Superhighway, STUDENT LAWYER, May 1995, at 17 ("Never forget that
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information that appears on a web page still travels through communica-
tions lines and hardware, in fixed locations around the globe. Web sites
and information are not stored in "cyberspace," but rather on computers
and servers located in some country, state, or municipality. Furthermore,
users connect to the Internet from physical locations around the globe.
While these users might be accessing the Internet remotely, the call still
emanates from a fixed location and ends at a fixed location.43 Finally, the
harm created by these Internet contacts must produce effects in some tan-
gible place. Accordingly, Internet contacts do not require the courts to
deviate from its precedent in any significant way. The only foreseeable
difficulty for courts is applying existing precedent correctly to an analo-
gous situation.
So why has the Internet stirred up such a hornet's nest with regard
to jurisdiction? The answer is simple. Using the various technologies of
the Internet, an individual can electronically visit another forum, transact
business in that forum, and cause effects in that forum-yet still be una-
ware that he has subjected himself to the laws of any particular forum.
Even more perplexing is the fact that all of these seemingly sophisticated
transactions can be accomplished using little more than a personal com-
puter, a telephone, a modem, and a connection to the Internet. While the
telephone, television, or radio might be as pervasive as the Internet, none
can approach the ease or efficiency with which an individual can com-
municate using the Internet.
An advertisement placed on the web would be available to anyone
who could find it, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. An In-
ternet advertisement could reach an individual (e-mail), a specifically de-
fined user group (point-to-multipoint messaging), or a community of
users extending around the world with some common interest (distributed
message database) all with a few strokes on the keyboard. This is where
the similarities with traditional forms of media end.
First, Internet media is more durable than traditional media. Tradi-
tional media advertisements or content in a newspaper, magazine, or pe-
riodical could easily be thrown away and thereby lost forever. Internet
media, on the other hand, is accessible every hour of every day and can
be transmitted to anyone who can find it. Next, Internet media is much
more pervasive than traditional media. Traditional media in a newspaper,
magazine, or periodical is often directed towards a market with limited
subscribership, such as a newspaper which serves a city or a magazine
the Internet is simply a bunch of interconnected wires, with computers at the ends of the
wires, and with people in front of the computers.").
43. See Ryan Yagura, Does Cyberspace Expand the Boundaries of Personal Juris-
diction, 38 IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 301, 302 (1998).
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which serves a particular audience base. Internet media, on the other
hand, is available to anyone around the world capable of connecting to
the information. Subscribership is irrelevant to the Internet medium. Fi-
nally, while some traditional forms of media approach the durability and
pervasiveness of the Internet medium, such as a toll-free number, none
are as self-supportive. Toll-free numbers often depend upon other forms
of media to advertise its existence, thereby limiting its reach. In contrast,
the Internet is self-advertising. It offers all the durability and communica-
tive force of traditional media, without a large investment and without
any advertisement.
PART III: PERSONAL JURISDICTION LAW
A. International Limitations on the Exercise of Personal
Jurisdiction
Without a doubt, the power of United States courts to exercise juris-
diction over foreign defendants incorporates special considerations of ter-
ritoriality and sovereignty, not otherwise indicated in solely domestic
cases. Unfortunately, there are no international treaties regarding the ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign interest, although one has
been proposed numerous times.4 As a result, the standards for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction remain rather amorphous, relying on the discretion of
the individual nations and the precepts of international comity. Oddly, in
the four United States Supreme Court cases that have dealt with personal
jurisdiction over foreign interests in civil cases during the modem era,
the Court has simply assumed that the United States Constitution pro-
vided the limits on the exercise of jurisdiction. 45 This has led some com-
mentators to suggest that any customary international law of jurisdiction
is now devoid of content. 6 But while the content of international juris-
diction law is perhaps unclear, most authorities agree that this category
44. See Andrew L. Strauss, Where America Ends and the International Order Be-
gins: Interpreting the Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Constitution in Light of a Proposed
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1237
(1998) (discussing the prospects of a Hague Convention to develop standards for personal
jurisdiction in international cases) [hereinafter Strauss, Hague Convention].
45. Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the Interna-
tional Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 373, 386-87
(1995) [hereinafter Strauss, Neglected Role]. This note examined four Supreme Court
cases in the minimum contacts era: Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company,
342 U.S. 437 (1952); Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd., v. Compagnie Des Bauxites
De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408 (1984); and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
46. See Strauss, Neglected Role, supra note 44 at 375 n.9.
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of international law does exist.47
As the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law explains, a
State's authority to subject foreign interests or activities to its laws is
bounded by certain limitations.48 A state's judicial power over a foreign
party can be said to hinge on its power to adjudicate. 49 Jurisdiction to ad-
judicate has been described as a State's authority to subject persons or
things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in
civil or criminal proceedings, whether or not the State is a party to the
proceedings.5 0 This power over a defendant requires a sufficient or rea-
sonable relation with the forum state.5' However, it is important to note
47. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 14 § 401 cmt. a (1987).
48. RESTATEMENT, supra note 14 § 401 cmt. a. The Restatement divides the exercise
of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant into three different categories: jurisdiction to pre-
scribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce. These roughly fall along the
traditional divisions of government-namely, the legislative, judicial, and executive
branches. However, the fit is not exact and it is important to note that power of jurisdic-
tion over foreign parties differs significantly from that over domestic parties. As it is used
in the Restatement and this Comment, the three categories of jurisdiction will be de-
scribed by the following: (a) jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e., the authority of a state to
make its laws applicable to persons or activities; (b) jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e., the
authority of a state to subject particular persons or things to its judicial process; and (c)
jurisdiction to enforce, i.e., the authority of a state to use the resources of government to
induce or compel compliance with its law. These categories of jurisdiction are often
interdependent.
49. Id., at § 401(b).
50. Id.
51. Id., at § 421(t). This section of the RESTATEMENT states, "(1) A state may exer-
cise jurisdiction through its courts to adjudicate with respect to a person or thing if the
relationship of the state to the person or thing is such as to make the exercise of jurisdic-
tion reasonable." According to subsection (2) of section 421 of the RESTATEMENT, a
state's exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate is generally reasonable, if at the time jurisdic-
tion is asserted:
(a) the person or thing is present in the territory of the state, other than transitorily;
(b) the person, if a natural person, is domiciled in the state;
(c) the person, if a natural person, is resident in the state;
(d) the person, if a natural person, is a national in the state;
(e) the person, if a corporation or comparable juridical person, is organized pursuant
to the law of the state;
(f) a ship, aircraft or other vehicle to which the adjudication relates is registered
under the laws of the state;
(g) the person, whether natural or personal, has consented to the exercise of
jurisdiction;
(h) the person, whether natural or juridical, regularly carries on business in the state;
(i) the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on activity in the state, but
only in respect to such activity;
(j) the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on outside the state an activ-
ity having a substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within the state, but only in
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that this standard under the Restatement-reasonableness-differs in
some significant ways from the United States' standard, crafted in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington.52 As a result, jurisdictional analyses
over foreign defendants will almost always require closer prelitigation
contacts between the defendant and the forum than would otherwise be
required in a domestic case.53 And, as in domestic cases, there is no clear
boundary as to which activities subject a foreign defendant to jurisdiction
in the United States. The court's determination will always be on a case-
by-case basis and "cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative."
54
But international cyberspace cases that call for international law
principles relating to jurisdiction are rare. For guidance, then, this Com-
ment will extrapolate from the "minimum contacts" standard in domestic
cases. This will provide a starting point for determining how to apply the
limiting factor of "reasonableness" in the international context.
B. United States Limitations on the Exercise of Personal
Jurisdiction
Ironically, United States constitutional limitations on the exercise of
judicial jurisdiction in United States courts can be traced to 19th century
perceptions about public international law. In Pennoyer v. Neff,55 the Su-
preme Court relied on two related principles of international law in artic-
ulating constitutional limits on state court judicial jurisdiction: (1) "every
State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
respect of such activity; or
(k) the thing that is the subject of adjudication is owned, possessed, or used in the
state, but only in respect of a claim reasonably connected with that thing. RE-
STATEMENT § 421(2).
52. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In International Shoe, the Supreme Court first enun-
ciated what was to become the modern standard for personal jurisdiction analysis. "[D]ue
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' " See Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in
International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 35-36 (1987). Noting that transitory
presence, for instance, is not a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate under international law, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 421 cmt. e; even though
"tag" jurisdiction may be in accordance with U.S. law. Cf. Burnham v. Superior Ct. of
Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 615 (1990) (Scalia, J.) ("We do not know of a single state or federal
statute, or a single judicial decision resting upon state law, that has abandoned in-state
service as a basis of jurisdiction. Many recent cases affirm it.")
53. Born, supra note 52, at 36.
54. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
55. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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property within its territory;" 56 and (2) "no State can exercise direct ju-
risdiction and authority over persons and property without its territory."57
The Court reasoned that these principles of international law also applied
to every state in the Union, limiting the judicial jurisdiction of state
courts. Under this territorial theory of sovereignty, a state court could ex-
ercise personal jurisdiction over any defendant who was served with pro-
cess within the territory of the state. 58 According to Pennoyer, however,
the Constitution provides limitations on the ability of a state to exercise
personal jurisdiction over persons located outside the state's territory, re-
gardless of that person's connection to the state.59 The Supreme Court
cited the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as the source of
this limitation.6° This limitation accorded with the dual system of federal-
ism and was intended to preserve the sovereign power of the independent
states.61
The twentieth century brought dramatic expansion in the amount of
interstate communication and transportation, placing increasing strain on
the territorial limitations of state court jurisdiction. Gradually, the rigid
territorialism of the Pennoyer model gave way to the "minimum con-
tacts" standard for personal jurisdiction announced in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington 62 This shift allowed the lower courts to concentrate on
the activities of the defendant in relation to the forum state, rather than
relying on the old fictions of the strict territorial model under Pennoyer.
The results were dramatic and made sense for a rapidly expanding, newly
mobile society.
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court shifted the focus of the
personal jurisdiction analysis to the defendant's activities and its relation-
ship to the forum state. The Court noted that a foreign party may be sued
in a state if the party has "certain minimum contacts with [the state]
such that maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
56. Id. at 722.
57. Id.
58. Writing for the Court in Pennoyer, Justice Field was greatly influenced by the
theories of Joseph Story. See Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965
SuP. CT. REV. 241, 262. Story urged a strong relationship between territory and legal au-
thority. One of the ideas he advanced was that the geographical origin of case facts deter-
mined whether legal authority existed. This idea gained increased cache during the second
half of the nineteenth century. See GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDER-
STANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12[A] at 43 (2nd ed. 1994).
59. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727 ("Process from the tribunals of one State cannot run
into another State").
60. See id. at 733.
61. See id.
62. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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fair play and substantial justice."' 63 Dispensing with the legal fictions of
the past, the Court announced that the personal jurisdiction analysis
should focus upon the "nature and quality" of the activities of the
defendant.64 In such an analysis, courts should consider both the quantity
of the party's contacts with the state and the relationship between those
contacts and the party's claims when determining whether the court could
exercise personal jurisdiction over the party.65
In dicta, the Court also indicated that courts should also consider
relevant an "estimate of the inconveniences," ' 66 to the defendant in de-
fending a suit away from its principal place of business.67 In the end, the
Court held that the appellant was properly amenable to suit in the State
of Washington because its activities there were "systematic and continu-
ous" and the suit arose out of those activities.68
After a brief period in which the exercise of personal jurisdiction
expanded rapidly,69 the Supreme Court refocused its analysis on the ac-
tivities of the defendant in Hanson v. Denckla.70 Brushing aside the con-
63. Id. at 316.
64. Id. at 318.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 317.
67. Id. This second prong of the analysis, which received only glancing treatment in
International Shoe, would live on in later opinions. This theory focused on the logic or
convenience of a forum. The Court fleshed out the logic/convenience theory in Traveler's
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). In that case, defendant Travelers sold in-
surance in Virginia without registering as required by state law. Virginia sued for an order
forbidding Travelers from doing business in the state. Travelers was served by mail in its
home state of Nebraska. The corporation appeared specially to challenge jurisdiction in
Virginia. Virginia's highest court upheld jurisdiction over Travelers and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed, holding the result to be "consistent with fair play and substan-
tial justice" and "not offensive to the Due Process Clause." Id. at 649. The Court found
that the "state has a legitimate interest in all insurance policies protecting its residents
against risks," id. at 647, an interest sufficient to support personal jurisdiction even if the
defendant cannot be found and served within the forum state. In addition, Travelers ex-
panded upon International Shoe's suggestion that courts address the actual degree of in-
convenience to the defendant when evaluating minimum contacts in each case. The Court
indicated that an examination of both sides of the convenience question might be in or-
der, and that the inquiry might be expanded to take into account reasons why the present
forum might be more convenient to plaintiff. Id. at 649.
68. Id. at 320.
69. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (finding the exercise of
jurisdiction by a California state court over a Texas insurance company to be permissible
although the insurance company neither solicited nor conducted business in California,
except for the single policy with McGee, and its only contact with the state was the sin-
gle policy with McGee).
70. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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venience of the forum reservations expressed in the dissent, the Court
concluded that there were no minimum contacts between the nonresident
defendant and the forum. 71 Simply stated, the majority found that the uni-
lateral activities of the plaintiffs alone could not transform this into a
case where Florida could exercise jurisdiction.72 In addition, the Court re-
fused to attach any importance to Florida's interest in adjudicating this
kind of lawsuit.73 In the end, the Court left no doubt that future personal
jurisdiction analyses based on minimum contacts should focus on two as-
pects: (1) the relationship between the forum and the defendant; and (2)
the contacts which reflected purposeful action by the defendant.74 How-
ever, the Court left unanswered important questions regarding how the
71. Dissenting from the Court's refusal to permit personal jurisdiction, Justice Black
argued the logic/convenience theory-that Florida would be a logical and convenient
place for the lawsuit. "Florida, the home of the principal contenders for Mrs. Donner's
largess, was a reasonably convenient forum for all." 357 U.S. at 259 (Black, J., dissent-
ing). The majority found that it was unnecessary to even reach that question of the logic
or convenience of the forum because there were no minimum contacts between the
defendant and the forum state. See id. at 251
72. See id. at 253. "The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum
State." Id. Hanson was a complicated case involving a nonresident trust based in Dela-
ware. In that case, the two factions fought over distribution of a $400,000 estate. The
Denckla group claimed that the money passed to them through the decedent's will. The
Hanson group claimed that the funds were not affected by the will because they were the
subject of a trust (with the Hanson group as beneficiaries) created by the decedent before
her death. The Denckla group brought suit in Florida to have the trust declared invalid.
Most of the Hanson-group defendants were Florida domiciliaries and were served there.
However, the Delaware-trustee defendants were foreign corporations who maintained no
office in Florida and had to be served out-of-state by mail. The Florida Supreme Court
eventually declared the trust invalid. It also ruled that personal jurisdiction existed over
two Delaware trust companies, defendants in the case who had been appointed trustees
for the disputed trust. On review, a narrowly divided Supreme Court disagreed, finding
that the Florida courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the trustees. Although the settlor
and most of the appointees and beneficiaries of the trust were domiciled in Florida, this
still did not unilaterally move the Delaware trustee in charge of the trust to Florida. Thus,
the Court found the exercise of jurisdiction impermissible.
73. See id. at 253. The Hanson Court entertained the possibility that the facts of the
controversy might so involve Florida State interests as to justify application of Florida
law, but instead found that Florida "does note acquire [] jurisdiction by being the 'center
of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The issue is
personal jurisdiction, not choice of law." Id.
74. See id. at 253. "The application of that rule will vary with the nature and qual-
ity of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Id.
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"quality and nature of defendant's activity" should be measured. 75
Almost twelve years later, the court answered at least some linger-
ing questions about the minimum contacts analysis in World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corporation v. Woodson.76 In this product liability suit, the plain-
tiffs, New York residents, brought suit in Oklahoma based on a car they
had purchased from the defendants in New York. 77 The Court found that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the New York regional distribu-
tor and retailer would offend due process. 78 The Court held that because
the defendants did not conduct or solicit business from Oklahoma in any
way, shape, or form, the mere fact that their product ended up there is
not sufficient to make them liable to suit there. 79 Rather, it was the
defendant's "conduct and connection" with the forum state that was im-
portant.80 When courts adhered to this standard, defendants could find
some minimal level of assurance when their conduct would render them
liable to suit in a foreign jurisdiction. 8' In the end, the Court found that a
defendant's contacts with a forum must not be "fortuitous,"
8 2 
"iso-
lated, '"83 or "attenuated." ' 84 Rather, the contract must "arise from the ef-
forts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the
market for its product in other States .... -85 At that point, it would not
be "unreasonable" to subject a defendant to suit in one of those States.86
Five years later in Burger King v. Rudzewicz, the Supreme Court be-
gan to explore the second part of the due process analysis-namely,
when granting personal jurisdiction would not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."' 87 Although the defendant did not
physically enter the forum State, the Court nonetheless found that the
defendant had "purposefully" established the requisite minimum contacts
with the state of Florida.88 The Court listed five factors which it would
75. Id.
76. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 298-299.
79. See generally id. at 295-98.
80. See id. at 297.
81. See id. ("The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the 'orderly administration of the
laws,' gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants
to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where the conduct
will and will not render them liable to suit.") (citation omitted). Id. at 297.
82. Id. at 295.
83. Id. at 297.
84. Id. at 299.
85. Id. at 297.
86. See id.
87. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
88. Id. at 478.
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consider when determining whether assertion of jurisdiction was funda-
mentally fair: (1) "the burden on the defendant;" (2) "the forum State's
interest in adjudicating the dispute;" (3) "the plaintiff's interest in ob-
taining convenient and effective relief;" (4) "the interstate judicial sys-
tem's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;"
and (5) "the shared interests of the several States in furthering funda-
mental substantive social policies."' 9 In the end, the Supreme Court per-
mitted Florida to exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant from Michigan who had voluntarily contracted with a Florida
corporation.9°
Finally, any discussion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
foreign defendant would be incomplete without mention of Asahi Metal
Industry Company v. Superior Court of California.91 Although the signifi-
cance of Asahi as a minimum contacts case is, at best, uncertain, 92 the
Court did invalidate jurisdiction over a foreign, nonresident defendant in
a due process holding.93
In Asahi, seven justices joined in Justice O'Connor's conclusion that
whether or not minimum contacts existed between the forum and Asahi,
California's attempt to exert personal jurisdiction exceeded a so-called
"reasonableness" standard, which incorporated the same five factors of
"fair play and substantial justice" listed in Burger King.94 Yet, in this
89. Id. at 477. Most of the balancing factors mentioned in Burger King previously
appeared as factors to be considered in a "reasonableness" analysis. See World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) [hereinafter World-Wide Volk-
swagen]. Factors two through five appeared as factors to be weighed against the burden
on the nonresident defendant of defending suit in a foreign jurisdiction. These factors in
World-Wide Volkswagen are clearly a surviving remnant of the logic/convenience analysis
begun in International Shoe and continued in Hanson. See supra note 71. However,
when these factors reappeared in Burger King in a "fair play and substantial justice"
analysis, the Court had added factor one, "burden to the defendant," to the list of coun-
tervailing factors to be weighed against the minimum contacts. See Burger King v.
Rudzewicz, supra note 87, at 476.
90. Id. at 487.
91. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Supreme Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
92. Only the Chief Justice and Justices Powell and Scalia joined Part II-A of Justice
O'Connor's opinion which concluded that the California forum lacked the minimum con-
tacts to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See id. at 105. Justice Brennan
(joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun) argued in a concurring opinion that
there were minimum contacts. See id. at 116. Justice Stevens (joined by Justices White
and Blackmun) suggested in another concurring opinion that California may have had
minimum contacts, but it was unnecessary for the Court to rule on this issue. See id. at
121.
93. See id. at 113-16.
94. Id. at 113.
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case, the Court reached the opposite conclusion with regard to jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, the Court remained sharply divided over the stream of
commerce analysis with regard to products liability cases.95 At this point,
however, it remains unclear whether the holding of Asahi is limited to its
unique factual situation.96
PART IV: PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET
A. Misleading Models
As the Supreme Court aptly noted in International Shoe, "It is evi-
dent that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those
activities which justify the subjection of a [nonresident defendant] to suit,
and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. 97
Amazingly, after over fifty years, we still have not escaped the fact-
dependent nature of the due process analysis. Despite all of the advances
in communication, travel, and commerce, the courts are still left with a
fact-specific test which must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. This is
the only way to assure that the defendant receives the minimum guaran-
tees of fairness under the law.
Presently, as courts begin to wade into the Internet medium, judges
and practitioners around the world are looking for a shorthand analysis to
gauge if, and when, Internet activity will subject a defendant to specific
jurisdiction in a foreign forum. This search has led courts to a very con-
fusing model, dividing web sites into two fuzzy categories and a broad,
indeterminate middle ground.98
95. Four Justices (Justice O'Connor, joined in the majority opinion by the Chief Jus-
tice, and Justices Powell and Scalia) believed that mere foreseeability or awareness that a
product would enter into the stream of commerce was not an act purposefully directed at
the forum state. In fact, Justice O'Connor believed that some additional conduct was re-
quired by the defendant to indicate an intent or purpose to serve the marketplace. See id.
at 112. Four other Justices (Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun) suggested in a concurring opinion that the "additional conduct" requirement
suggested by Justice O'Connor's opinion was an unnecessary addition to the stream of
commerce analysis. As long as a defendant was aware that the final product was being
marketed in a forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there could not come as a surprise.
In such a case, the defendant had clearly inured himself of the benefits of that State's
laws and it would not be unfair to subject the defendant to jurisdiction there. See id. at
117.
96. In this case, the California Court may have had minimum contacts over a non-
resident defendant, yet was unable to exercise personal jurisdiction without offending no-
tions of "fair play and substantial justice." Even to the Court this case seemed an anom-
aly. See id. at 116 ("one of those rare cases.") (Brennan, J., concurring).
97. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
98. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
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At one end of the scale are web sites where a defendant clearly does
business over the Internet. If the defendant entered into contracts with re-
sidents of a foreign jurisdiction that involved the knowing and repeated
transmission of files to another computer, personal jurisdiction would be
proper.99
At the other end of the scale are web sites where a defendant has
posted information which is simply accessible to users in foreign juris-
dictions. According to this model, a passive web site that does little more
than make information available to those who are interested in it is not
grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction. 100
The middle ground is occupied by "interactive" web sites where a
user can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the
exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interac-
tivity and the information that gets exchanged.' 0' While these three cate-
gories might put courts on notice about what to watch for when examin-
ing a web site in a personal jurisdiction analysis, these categories are
hardly determinative. In fact, they are downright misleading.
These categories are enigmatic for two main reasons. First, the cate-
gories do not take into account contacts from other Internet communica-
tions medium, such as e-mail and distributed message databases. 102 Even
the most interactive web page will often require additional contacts to
demonstrate that "something more" which courts have found necessary
for the exercise of jurisdiction.103 As it now stands, these categories only
consider web site contacts in the personal jurisdiction analysis. Second,
the categories do not take into account the cause of action. The harm in
an intentional tort action is quite different from the injury caused in a
breach of contract suit. Generally speaking, the injury is the key. The
harm in a trademark infringement case may come from a press release on
1996) ("[O]ur review of the available cases and materials reveals that the likelihood that
personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the na-
ture and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. This
sliding scale is consistent with well-developed personal jurisdiction principles.") (footnote
omitted).
99. See id. See also, e.g., Compuserve, Inc. v Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.
1996) and discussion infra nn. 170-90 and accompanying text.
100. See Zippo, 952 E Supp. at 1124. See also, e.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v.
King, 937 F.Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 126 F.3d. 25 (2d Cir. 1997) and discussion infra
nn. 110-28 and accompanying text.
101. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. See also, e.g., Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.,
947 F.Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) and discussion infra nn. 303-25 and accompanying
text.
102. See discussion infra note 35.
103. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 57 (D.D.C. 1998).
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a "passive" web site, whereas a breach of contract case may require a
persistent course of conduct between the participants before a court will
exercise jurisdiction. Accordingly, the nature of the web site is often not
a very good indicator as to whether the exercise of jurisdiction is
permissible.
As the next section will indicate, personal jurisdiction is often de-
pendent upon whom the nonresident defendant determined was the in-
tended audience. While the case law is muddled in many respects, there
is at least one unifying concept the intent of the defendant. Oftentimes,
this intent is quite clear from the nature of the advertisement or con-
tent.10 4 Sometimes it is not and other affiliating circumstances are re-
quired.105 The next section classifies the existing personal jurisdiction
cases based on Internet contacts into three categories-each defined by
the end result of the personal jurisdiction question.
B. Cases
As the cases below demonstrate, the existing body of decisions re-
garding in personam jurisdiction based on Internet contacts is inconsistent
and incoherent on many levels. First, there is an openly acknowledged
split between the districts regarding the weight to be afforded to elec-
tronic contacts over the Internet.1°6 Next, it is uncertain why some courts
seem to require additional contacts with the forum state while others
seem to find that the web site alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 10 7
Finally, and most importantly, the very significance of Internet contacts
is in dispute. The court in Zippo analyzed the defendant's contacts by
looking at the number of Pennsylvania residents using the defendant's In-
104. See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W. 2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997) (finding the defendant intended to advertise its wagering service to an American
market).
105. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (1997) (illustrating that
in the cases finding jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based on Internet advertise-
ments or solicitations, "something more" is required to subject the advertiser to jurisdic-
tion in the plaintiff's home state).
106. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097, 19-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (U.S.
Magistrate Peck declining to follow the holdings in Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.
Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp.
161 (D.Conn. 1996); and Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation, 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1996)).
107. Compare Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding that "something more" than simply an Internet advertisement is required for per-
sonal jurisdiction), with Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation, 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C.
1996) (although the court declined to decide whether the web site alone would confer ju-
risdiction, it is clear from the analysis that it would).
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ternet-based service. 08 On the other hand, the court in Granite Gate
looked at the number of residents from the State of Minnesota accessing
the site as well as which States produced the most frequent users of the
service. 109
For ease of analysis, the following cases have been divided into
three categories based on how the jurisdictional question was resolved.
These categories include: (1) electronic contacts not supporting the exer-
cise of jurisdiction; (2) electronic contacts plus "something more" sup-
porting personal jurisdiction; and (3) electronic contacts alone supporting
the exercise of jurisdiction.
1. Electronic Contacts Not Supporting Exercise of Personal
Jurisdiction
a. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King
One of the most widely cited cases in which the court found that a
web site did not constitute the necessary minimum contacts is Bensusan
Restaurant Corporation v. King."0 Bensusan was the operator of "The
Blue Note" jazz club in New York City. King was the owner and opera-
tor of the "The Blue Note" club in Columbia, Missouri."' Even though
Bensusan owned the rights to the federally registered mark "The Blue
Note," nonetheless, King posted a web site that advertised his Columbia
Blue Note club." 2 The web site included a local Missouri telephone
number and ticket information."3 Bensusan brought an action in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York. In that suit he
claimed that King's web site, which had both "The Blue Note" name
and a logo similar to Bensusan's, constituted trademark infringement.' 4
The court granted King's motion to dismiss for lack of personal ju-
risdiction.115 First the court examined Bensusan's assertion of jurisdiction
108. See Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119, 1125 (1997).
109. See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d. 715, 720-721 (1997).
110. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
111. See id. at 297.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. King's web site did contain a disclaimer stating that it was not to be
confused with the club's namesake in New York, and recommended that its web site
viewers visit the New York club when in that city. See id. at 297. Bensusan's action also
asserted claims for trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition.
See id. at 298.
115. See generally id. at 299-301 (holding that the New York long-arm statutes did
not confer jurisdiction over the defendant, and, even if it did, asserting jurisdiction would
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under the New York long arm statute." 6 The court found that due to the
nature of the infringement cause of action, the deception occurred in
Missouri and not New York. 17 Accordingly, the injury could not have
occurred in New York, fulfilling a precondition of the long-arm statute." 8
The court noted that if a customer wanted to attend a show at the
defendant's club in Missouri, he would have had to find the web site, or-
der tickets from a Missouri phone number, and pick the tickets up in
Missouri (because King did not mail or transmit the tickets). 1 9 Even if
there was confusion about the product, that confusion occurred in Mis-
souri, not New York.1 20 Additionally, the court also did not accept Ben-
susan's argument that King should have foreseen that the web site would
be viewed in New York and have consequences in that State.' 21
Finally, the court found that even if New York's long-arm statute
conferred jurisdiction, the exercise of jurisdiction would have violated the
limits of the Due Process Clause. 122 King did nothing to purposefully
avail himself of the benefits and protections of the laws of New York.
Borrowing from the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Asahi, the Ben-
susan court compared creating a web site to "placing a product into the
stream of commerce," in that its effects "may be felt nationwide--or
even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed
towards the forum state."' 123 In the end, there was no indication that King
sought or encouraged New Yorkers to access his site. 24
Almost two years later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court's holding on fairly narrow grounds. 25 This hold-
violate the Due Process Clause because the defendant had not purposefully availed him-
self of the benefits of New York).
116. See id. at 299-300. Bensusan asserted jurisdiction under New York's long-arm
statute, C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2) and (a)(3)(ii). Section 302(a)(2) allows jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant who commits a "tortious act within the state" when the cause of
action arises from the tortious act. Section 302(a)(3)(ii) allows a court to exercise juris-
diction over a non-resident defendant for tortious acts committed outside the state that
cause injury in the state if the non-resident "expects or should reasonably expect the act
to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or inter-
national commerce." Id. at 299.
117. See id. at 299.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 299.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 300.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 301 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1987) (plurality opinion)).
124. Id.
125. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1997).
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ing was not very instructive, however, because the court decided the case
strictly on the basis of New York's long-arm statute. 126 The Second Cir-
cuit found that if any tortious acts were committed by King, under the
New York long-arm statute, they occurred in Missouri. 127 Moreover,
King's club should be considered a local operation because it did not
"derive substantial revenue from interstate commerce."' 128
This case remains one of the premier examples of the entirely "lo-
cal" use of a web site. As the court found, the defendant used his In-
ternet web site in a manner which solicited only local business. Defend-
ant made no attempt to market to anyone outside the State of Missouri.
This type of local business solicitation is consistent throughout this
category.
b. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.
A recent Ninth Circuit opinion reinforced the notion, begun in the
Bensusan line of cases, that a web site or other electronic contact alone,
was not purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of the laws
of a forum state. In Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., l2 9 the plaintiff, an
Arizona corporation ("Cybersell Arizona"), sued a Florida Corporation
("Cybersell Florida"), for the latter's trademark infringement through a
web site.' 30 When the defendants placed their home page on the web in
October 1995, the page included a logo and a local Orlando telephone
number.131
The court's analysis began with a nod to the Arizona long-arm stat-
ute, which extended to the full limits of the Due Process Clause. 32 Es-
sentially, Cybersell Arizona argued that because the harm of trademark
infringement occurs where the "passing off" of the mark occurs, juris-
diction was permissible over the defendants based on their solicitation
over the Internet. 13 3 In response, Cybersell Florida argued that this would
mean they would be subject to nationwide, or even worldwide, jurisdic-
126. See id. at 27 ("Because we believe that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in
the instant case is proscribed by the law of New York, we do not address the issue of due
process.").
127. See id. at 29.
128. See id.
129. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cit. 1997).
130. See id. at 415. Interestingly, the principals of Cybersell Arizona are Laurence
Canter and Martha Siegal, known among web users as the first "spammers" of the In-
ternet. Spamming refers to the posting of indiscriminate advertisements to newsgroups on
USENET.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 416.
133. Id.
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tion simply for using the Internet. 134
In its analysis, the court reasoned that while "anyone, anywhere
could access [defendants] home page," that fact alone could not demon-
strate that Cybersell Florida was trying to target Arizona residents. 3 Ex-
amining the existing Internet personal jurisdiction cases, the court found
that "no court has ever held that an Internet advertisement alone [was]
sufficient to subject the advertiser to jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home
state."' 36 The Ninth Circuit noted that in each case where the court exer-
cised jurisdiction on the basis of a web site, there was always "'some-
thing more' to indicate that the defendant purposefully (albeit electroni-
cally) directed his activity in a substantial way to the forum state."' 37
The court found that Cybersell Florida did nothing to encourage people
in Arizona to access its site, and did not seek or gain any business in Ar-
izona. 3 Additionally, the court found the " 'effects' test" employed by
the Supreme Court in Calder v. Jones to be inapplicable to the case at
bar. 139
c. Other cases of note
In Hearst v. Goldberger, the Southern District of New York rein-
forced its decision in Bensusan by declining to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over a lawyer residing in New Jersey.' 4° That case also involved a
domain name dispute in which the court also held that the exercise of ju-
risdiction was limited by the New York long arm statute. 14' Ironically, the
134. Id.
135. Id. at 419.
136. Id. at 418.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 419. The court found that Cybersell Florida didn't receive any money,
telephone calls, e-mails, or hits on its site from Arizona. In addition, it didn't have an
800 number on its web site. See id.
139. See id. at 420 (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)). In Calder v.
Jones, the Court looked to whether the effects of out-of-state actions prevented a State
"from asserting jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of those effects." See Cal-
der, 465 U.S. at 788.
140. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). This
case is somewhat distinguishable because it reached its conclusion based entirely on the
basis of the New York long-arm statute, much like the Bensusan cases, and did not even
reach the minimum contacts analysis. In addition, this case was based on very unique
facts. The defendant was operating a web site using the plaintiff's trademark as the do-
main name. But the defendant's web site advertised a service it would offer in the future.
Based on these facts, the court fully admitted that it would have likely had jurisdiction if
the plaintiff had filed suit after defendant had begun selling his services to New Yorkers.
Id. at *11.
141. See generally id. at *7-15
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court also noted that jurisdiction might well have been proper if the
plaintiff had just waited until the defendant's business was operational
and New Yorkers had begun to respond to the advertisement.
142
Another case in which the court found that a web site could not
confer jurisdiction over a foreign non-resident defendant was Weber v.
Jolly Hotels.143 In that case, a New Jersey plaintiff was injured in a fall
while at one of the defendant's hotels in Italy and attempted to bring suit
against the defendant in the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey. 44 The plaintiff tried to assert general jurisdiction over the
defendant hotel chain based on a "passive" web site.145 The court analo-
gized the plaintiff's claim to advertising in a national magazine and re-
fused to exercise jurisdiction on that basis.' 46
Finally, the case of McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 47 in-
volved a suit over copyright infringement and unfair competition regard-
ing the misuse of a photograph.148 The plaintiff, McDonough, was a Cali-
fornia sports photographer and the defendant, Fallon McElligott, Inc.,
was an advertising agency based in Minnesota. 149 The plaintiff claimed
that the defendants knowingly reproduced a photo taken by the plaintiff
without its permission for use in one of its national advertising cam-
paigns and then never gave the plaintiff credit for taking the photo-
graph.150 Although the defendant's principal place of business was in
Minnesota, the plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California.' 5 ' Plaintiff asserted that although
the defendant had no clients in California and didn't maintain any em-
ployees in California, the court should nonetheless find jurisdiction over
the defendant. 52 The plaintiff reasoned that because the defendant oper-
ated a web site which was accessible in California, its operations in Cali-
fornia were sufficient to support general jurisdiction. 53 Refusing to exer-
cise either general or specific jurisdiction, the court stated that "allowing
142. See id. at * 11. Defendant's web site advertised a litigation support business to
be offered in the future. Id. at *10.
143. 1997 WL 574950 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 1997).
144. See id. at *1.
145. See id. at *5.
146. See id. at *6.
147. 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1826 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996).
148. See id. at 1827.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 1828.
153. The court found that defendant's contacts were not sufficiently "substantial,
systematic or contiguous to warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction." Id. at 1829.
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computer interaction via the web to supply sufficient contacts to establish
jurisdiction would eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirement as it
currently exists."' 154
2. Electronic Contacts Plus "Something More" Supporting
Personal Jurisdiction
In Cybersell,155 the court examined the trend in personal jurisdiction
decisions involving the Internet, explaining that courts have not found In-
ternet advertising alone to be sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. 156
in the cases finding jurisdiction, the Cybersell court noted that there was
always " 'something more' to indicate that the defendant purposefully
(albeit electronically) directed his activity in a substantial way to the fo-
rum state.' 157 The "something more" that the court pointed to was an
additional fact or affiliating contact by the defendant which indicated that
the defendant intended to serve or intended to direct its activities towards
the forum. This section looks at those cases in which the courts identi-
fied additional contacts, beyond the contact cited in the cause of action,
to exercise personal jurisdiction.
a. California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc.
In perhaps the first case to address the issue of electronic contacts
and its effect on the "minimum contacts" analysis, California Software,
Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., foreshadowed the analytical problems of
the new information age.158
In this case, California Software, Inc. ("California Software"), a
California corporation, sued Reliability Research, Inc., ("RRI") a Nevada
corporation with its principal place of business in Vermont, for alleged
false statements made by the latter. California Software claimed that RRI
made false statements to prospective California Software customers over
the telephone, through the mail, and over a distributed message
database 159 known as the Computer Reliability Forum ("CRF"), which
constituted tortious interference with their right to contract.160 The court
154. Id. at 1828.
155. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
156. See id. at 418.
157. Id.
158. California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356 (C.D.
Cal. 1986).
159. See id. at 1360-64.
160. See id. at 1358. More specifically, California Software claimed intentional in-
terference with prospective economic advantage, slander of title, libel, slander, civil con-
spiracy, unfair competition, and intentional interference with their right to pursue a lawful
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ultimately refused to confer general jurisdiction over the defendants
based on the CRF, but did find specific jurisdiction based on the tele-
phone calls, the mail, and the CRF.' 61
Using the Supreme Court's analysis in Calder v. Jones,162 the court
found that the use of the mail and the telephone by the defendants pro-
vided specific jurisdiction in California because those communications
were purposefully directed to cause harm in California. 63 The court also
found that the communications over the CRF by the defendants conferred
specific jurisdiction. 64 Although RRI argued that it was just responding
to a question posed on the CRF by a third person outside of California,,
the court found that the defendants intended for their communication to
have a direct effect in California. 65 The communication over the CRF by
the defendant was intentionally designed to manipulate others to not buy
the plaintiff's product in California, thereby causing harm in California. 66
In a bit of foreshadowing, the court discussed how modem technol-
ogy was again pressing the boundaries of personal jurisdiction out-
wards. 167 Noting the expansion of personal jurisdiction that the Supreme
Court had exercised in McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co.,168 the court stated,
"[W]hile modem technology has made nationwide commercial transac-
tions simpler and more feasible, even for small businesses, it must
broaden correspondingly the permissible scope of jurisdiction exercisable
by the courts."' 169
b. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson
Regularly recognized as the prototypical electronic "minimum con-
tacts" case, the Sixth Circuit in CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson70 also
used the "something more" approach to exercise jurisdiction. In this
business as a result of two sets of communications made by defendants. Id.
161. See id. at 1359-64.
162. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
163. See California Software, Inc., 631 F. Supp. at 1361.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1361-62. One of the defendants placed a message on the CRF in re-
sponse to inquiries made by prospective buyers of the plaintiff's software package. That
message warned users of the plaintiff's software package about a potential software li-
cense dispute with the defendants. The message by the defendant warned that anyone
who purchased the plaintiff's software package would be held financially liable for its
misuse if the defendants ultimtely prevailed in their suit. See id. at 1358-59 n.2.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1363.
168. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
169. See California Software, Inc., 631 F. Supp. at 1363.
170. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
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case, CompuServe, Inc. ("CompuServe"), an Ohio corporation and on-
line service provider, sought a declaratory judgment in a matter involving
Richard Patterson, a Texas resident and CompuServe subscriber. 171 Patter-
son claimed that CompuServe was marketing and distributing
"shareware" on its system in violation of the common law trademarks
which he and his company owned and enjoyed. 72 After Patterson de-
manded money to settle his potential claims, CompuServe filed a declara-
tory judgment action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio. 173 In response, Patterson filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction in which he claimed to have never visited
Ohio. 174
In 1991, Patterson placed his shareware on CompuServe's system
for others to use and purchase. i 7 When Patterson became a shareware
provider, he entered into a "Shareware Registration Agreement"
("SRA") with CompuServe. 176 From 1991 through 1994, Patterson trans-
mitted (from Texas) thirty-two master software files to CompuServe (in
Ohio), which CompuServe then placed on its server for all of its sub-
scribers to access. 177 In December 1993, Patterson notified CompuServe
by e-mail that it was infringing on his common law trademarks. 78 Com-
puServe changed the name of its program, but to no avail. Patterson con-
tinued to complain and CompuServe brought this declaratory judgment. 79
171. See id. at 1259.
172. See id. at 1261. Shareware is a type of software which is created by anyone,
including CompuServe, and distributed free. Once a person downloads shareware, the end
user is expected to pay the creator the suggested licensing fee if the user keeps and uses
the software beyond the specified trial period. Id. at 1260. Defendant Patterson claimed
that the terms "WinNav," "Windows Navigator," and "Flashpoint Windows Navigator"
were all common law trademarks which he and his company owned. Id. At 1261.
173. Id. at 1261.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1260.
176. Id. Under the SRA, CompuServe agreed to provide its subscribers with access
to the software that the creator had written. The SRA purported to create an independent
contractor relationship with the creator, in this case Patterson. The SRA did not mention
the software by name, but rather left the content and the identification to Patterson. The
SRA incorporated both a Service Agreement and a Rules of Operation. Both have a
"choice of forum" clause expressly providing that the contract was entered into in Ohio,
and the Service Agreement further provides a "choice of laws" clause which states that
the contract is to "be governed and construed in accordance with" Ohio law. Id.
177. See id. at 1261. Patterson claimed that he sold less than $650 worth of his
software to only twelve Ohio residents. See id.
178. See id. Patterson's software product was a program designed to help people
navigate around the Internet. CompuServe began to market a similar product that Patter-
son took to be too similar to his own.
179. See id.
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The district court granted Patterson's motion to dismiss for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction.180 Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed.18 '
The Sixth Circuit began its opinion by noting that technology has
dramatically expanded commerce, communications, and, consequently,
the limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 182 "[T]here is less per-
ceived need today for the federal constitution to protect defendants from
'inconvenient litigation,' because all but the most remote forums are eas-
ily accessible for the pursuit of both business and litigation." 183 Driving
this most recent expansion of the courts' power over nonresident defend-
ants, the court noted that the Internet is "perhaps the latest and greatest
manifestation of these historical, globe-shrinking trends."' 18 4
In its analysis, the court reasoned that Patterson purposefully con-
tracted with an Ohio company to distribute his product. 85 Far from being
"random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated," Patterson perpetuated the rela-
tionship with CompuServe by repeatedly communicating with its system
in Ohio.'86 This relationship was intended to be ongoing in nature and
not merely a "one-shot affair."8 7 The court also made special note that it
was not deciding this case based on simply the existence of the contract
with CompuServe or the fact that Patterson put his software on Com-
puServe's system. The court noted that while either of these activities,
taken alone, might not subject Patterson to jurisdiction, deliberately doing
both plus the other factors mentioned supported the exercise of
jurisdiction. 88
These "plus factors" included the repeated e-mail and regular mail
messages, a message about the infringement action on one of Com-
puServe's distributed message forums, and Patterson's demand for
money. 89 In addition, the court had no problem finding that the cause of
action arose from Patterson's forum-related activities and that the exer-
cise of jurisdiction was reasonable. 9°
180. See id.
181. Id. at 1269.
182. See id. at 1262 (citation omitted).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1263.
186. Id. at 1263-64 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985)).
187. Id. at 1265 (citation omitted).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1266.
190. Id. at 1267-68. Yet, the court did explicitly note the limited precedential value
of its holding. The court stated that it was not holding that Patterson could be subject to
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c. Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen
In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,191 Panavision (a Cali-
fornia corporation) sued Dennis Toeppen (an Illinois resident) for his re-
gistration and appropriation of the corporation's trademark as a domain
name. .Of particular interest in this decision is the court's approval of the
lower court's findings that Toeppen's registration of Panavision's trade-
mark was part of a larger scheme to obtain money from Panavision. 192 As
the Ninth Circuit noted, this deliberate scheme to extort money from
Panavision provided the "something more" which was conspicuously ab-
sent in the court's earlier case in Cybersell 93
Using the "effects doctrine" first announced in Calder,94 the court
found that Toeppen had met the "purposeful availment" requirement nec-
essary for personal jurisdiction. 195 Distinguishing the present case from its
holding in Cybersell,196 the Panavision court found that Toeppen had pur-
posefully registered Panavision's trademarks "to force Panavision to pay
him money."' 197
In an analysis of the harm caused by Toeppen's infringement, the
court found that Toeppen knew that the brunt of the harm to Panavision
would be in California because that was where they conducted their busi-
ness. 98 Toeppen countered by arguing that if an injury occurred at all, it
suit in any state where his software was purchased or used; or that Patterson could be
subject to suit in Ohio from an injury by the software in a third state; or that Com-
puServe could sue any regular subscriber in Ohio. See id.
191. 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
192. See id. at 1318. Panavision accused Toeppen of being a "cyber pirate" who
steals valuable trademarks and registers domain names on the Internet using these trade-
marks. The object of such a scheme was to sell the domain names to the rightful trade-
mark owners for money. In this case, Toeppen offered to "settle the matter" if Panavi-
sion would pay him $13,000 in exchange for the domain name. See id. at 1319. The
court found that Toeppen had registered other domain names for various other companies
including Delta Airlines, Neiman Marcus, Eddie Bauer, Lufthansa, and over 100 other
marks. See id.
193. See id. at 1320-21 (quoting Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420
n.6 (9th Cir. 1997)).
194. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (establishing an "effects test" for in-
tentional action aimed at the forum state).
195. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 155-57. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,
130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
197. See Panavision, 141 F3d at 1321.
198. Id. Although Panavision was incorporated in Delaware, its principal place of
business was in California, at "the heart of the theatrical motion picture and television in-
dustry." Id. (citation omitted).
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occurred in "cyberspace."199 As he had not entered the State of Califor-
nia and did not direct any activity there, the injury could not have oc-
curred in Califomia.2°° The Panavision court disagreed. They found that
the "something more," which the Ninth Circuit required in Cybersell,
was provided by the evidence that Toeppen was running a scheme di-
rected at California.201 The court also found that the cause of actiQn arose
out of Toeppen's forum-related activities and that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over Toeppen, an Illinois resident, would not be unreasonable. 202 Al-
though the burden on Toeppen to litigate in California would be signifi-
cant, the burden would not be so great as to deprive him of due
process. 203
d. Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com
In Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,2°4 Zippo
Manufacturing Co. ("Manufacturing"), a Pennsylvania Corporation,
brought suit against Zippo Dot Com, Inc. ("Dot Com"), a California cor-
poration, for the latter's alleged violations of federal and state trademark
protection laws. 20 5 The claims arose from Dot Corn's use of the trade-
marked word "Zippo" in the domain names "zippo.com," "zippo.net,"
and "zipponews.com," on its web site; and in the headers of the news
service messages it posted.206 In its analysis, the court acknowledged that
most of Dot Com's contacts with Pennsylvania occurred almost exclu-
sively over the Internet 2 7-but not entirely.208
199. See id. at 1322 & n.2.
200. See id. at 1322. Toeppen claimed that all he had done was register Panavision's
trademark as a domain name in Illinois and post a web site using that mark. Id.
201. See id. In this case the court found that the "something more" was provided
by the defendant's obvious attempt to extort money from the defendants using their name.
202. See id. at 1322-24.
203. Id.
204. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
205. See id. at 1121. Manufacturing filed a five-count complaint against Dot Coin
alleging trademark dilution, infringement, and false designation under the Federal Trade-
mark Act as well as state trademark dilution. Id.
206. See id.
207. See id. Dot Com's employees, offices, and equipment are all located in Califor-
nia. Dot Com's advertising about its service occurs over its web site, which was accessi-
ble to Pennsylvania residents over the Internet. At the time of the trial, defendants had
about 140,000 paying customers, of which 3,000 were Pennsylvania residents. To become
a subscriber of Dot Com, customers needed to fill out a subscription form located on Dot
Com's web site. Payment was made by credit card over the Internet or by telephone. Id.
208. Id. The court noted specifically that Dot Com had entered into agreements with
seven Internet Service Providers ("ISP's") in Pennsylvania to permit their subscribers to
access Dot Com's news service. Two of these providers were located in the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania. Id.
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In Zippo, the court found that the cause of action arose out of the
defendant's contact with the forum and that the exercise of jurisdiction
over the defendant was reasonable. 209 On its behalf, Dot Com argued that
although its web site was accessible by Pennsylvania residents, "advertis-
ing" or "operating a Web site" was not equal to "doing business in
Pennsylvania. ' 210 The court found Dot Com's argument that it had not
purposefully availed itself of the laws of Pennsylvania to be "wholly un-
persuasive. ' 21' Dot Corn had sold passwords to about 3,000 Pennsylvania
subscribers and entered into seven contracts with ISPs to provide their
service to customers. 212 Defendant also asserted that its contacts with the
forum were "fortuitous" within the meaning of World Wide Volk-
swagen.21 3 But again the court disagreed. 214 Dot Corn "repeatedly and
consciously" chose to process the applications from Pennsylvania re-
sidents and assign them passwords. The transmission of those files was
entirely within the defendant's discretion.21 5
Zippo is a fairly unique opinion because the court attempted to fash-
ion a three-category, sliding scale framework to help future courts ana-
lyze personal jurisdiction suits involving Internet contacts. 2 6 Under this
classification system, the court felt that this case was most analogous to
the line of cases which included "doing business over the Internet," evi-
dent in Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson.2
17
e. Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation
In Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation,218 the plaintiff Heroes, Inc.
("Heroes") sued Heroes Foundation ("Foundation") for trademark in-
209. Id. at 1127.
210. Id. at 1126.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (quoting World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295
(1980)).
214. Id. The court provided here an excellent example of what a fortuitous contact
in the context of World Wide Volkswagen might look like. Dot Corn's contacts with Penn-
sylvania would be fortuitous "if it had no Pennsylvania subscribers and an Ohio sub-
scriber forwarded a copy of a file he obtained from Dot Corn to a friend in Pennsylvania
or an Ohio subscriber brought his computer along on a trip to Pennsylvania and used it to
access Dot Corn's service. That is not the situation here." Id.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 1124. This is the same classification system determined to be mis-
leading. See supra text accompanying notes 97-105.
217. See id. at 1125. See supra text accompanying notes 170-90.
218. 958 F Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
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fringement and unfair competition. 2 9 Plaintiff Heroes was a District of
Columbia charity begun in 1964 which registered and owned the service
mark "Heroes. ' 220 The defendant Foundation was a New York charity
begun in 1990 which began using the "Heroes Foundation" name and
logo in 1993.221 Claiming that Foundation's use of the name "Heroes
Foundation" and related names was likely to cause potential contributors
to be confused, Heroes brought this lawsuit raising state and federal
claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition. 222
First, the court examined the defendant's contacts with the forum
state to ensure that it met the District of Columbia's long-arm statute.
Foundation claimed that its only contact with the forum was a newspaper
advertisement published in The Washington Post and a web site with the
trademarked name and logo.2 23 The court found that both of these con-
tacts, taken together, were sufficient to indicate that Foundation had pur-
posefully availed itself of the "privilege of conducting activities within
the District. ' 224 Even without the newspaper advertisement, however, the
court implied that the District of Columbia could assert personal jurisdic-
tion over Foundation as its "home page [was] certainly a sustained con-
tact within the district." 225
Initially, the court found that the newspaper advertisement suffi-
ciently indicated that Foundation intended to solicit donations in the Dis-
trict. 226 Although the advertisement in The Washington Post Was actually
placed by Proctor & Gamble, it had the Foundation's name and telephone
number.227 The court found Proctor & Gamble's involvement insignifi-
cant. Because the Foundation "knew the advertisement was placed, ap-
proved of it, and received publicity and substantial contributions as a re-
sult of it," 228 the placement of the advertisement met the requirements for
219. Id. at 2.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 2.
223. Id. at 3.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 5.
226. See id. at 3.
227. See id. at 3-4. The advertisement invited readers to "Help Donate $100,000 to
Boomer Esiason's Heroes Foundation and Find a Cure for Cystic Fibrosis." Id. at 3. The
advertisement displayed a photograph of Boomer Esiason, a quarterback for the National
Football League at the time, and his son who suffers from cystic fibrosis. Attached to the
advertisement, which appeared in the insert in the newspaper's Sunday edition, were cou-
pons for several Proctor & Gamble products. The advertisement explained that Proctor &
Gamble would donate up to $100 to the Heroes Foundation for each redeemed coupon. It
also gave a toll-free telephone number for Foundation. See id.
228. Id. at 3.
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purposefulness under Asahi.2 29
With regard to the web page, the court found Foundation's web
page equally as indicative of the charity's intent to operate in the District
of Columbia.230 The Foundation tried to characterize its home page as
"essentially passive" and "not really targeted at any particular forum."'23'
However, the court was unconvinced.232 As the web site was not the only
contact with the forum the court declined to decide if the web site alone
would provide the "minimum contacts" necessary to establish personal
jurisdiction. 233 Taking a page from Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set,
Inc.,234 the court emphasized the durable nature of the information con-
tained on web sites. While hard copy advertisements are quickly disposed
of and reach a limited number of potential customers, Internet advertise-
ments can be accessed again and again by many potential customers.
235
As a result, the court found that its exercise of jurisdiction in the District
of Columbia based on the newspaper advertisement, and especially the
web site, would not be unreasonable.236
f. American Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect
Atlanta
In another case from the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York, a New York Internet Service Provider, Ameri-
can Network, Inc. ("ANI"), brought this suit for traderfiark infringement
and unfair competition against Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc.
("Access"), a Georgia Internet Service Provider.237 In its suit, ANI
claimed that a mark used by Access, "America.Net," had infringed upon
a mark that ANI owned, "American.Net. ' 238 The defendant moved to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.239 The court found that the exer-
229. See id. Distinguishing this case from the others that Foundation cited, the court
found that this case involved an advertisement "placed specifically in the forum's local
newspaper, not in a national newspaper or a trade publication which happen[ed] to circu-
late there." Id.
230. See id. at 4-5.
231. Id. at 4.
232. Id. at 4. The home page contained the trademarked name, logo, and a toll free
telephone number for soliciting contributions. Id. at 5.
233. Id. at 5.
234. 937 F Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
235. See Heroes, 958 F. Supp. at 5 (quoting Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164-65).
236. See id. at 5.
237. American Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta, Inc., No. 96 Civ.
6823 (LLS), 1997 WL 466507 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1997).
238. Id. at *1.
239. Id.
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cise of personal jurisdiction was proper both under the New York long-
arm statute and the Due Process Clause. 24°
As the cause of action arose from Access' web site, ANI claimed
that the New York court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant
based on the New York long-arm statute. 4' Access reduced its argument
to two simple points: (1) ANI did not suffer an injury in New York, and
(2) it was not reasonably foreseeable that Access' acts in Georgia would
have New York consequences. 242 The defendant argued that all of its of-
fices, employees, and business facilities, including its server, were lo-
cated in Georgia. 243 In addition, it owned no property in New York.2 4
Contrary to that position,'ANI claimed that Access' home page contained
the allegedly infringing mark and provided the minimum contacts with
the forum. 245 The court agreed with ANI on both points.
First, the court found that ANI suffered injury in New York because
New York users had seen the mark on the defendant's web site on their
computer screens in New York and had been "confused and deceived"
by the mark.2 46 With regard to the defendant's second contention, the
court found that it was reasonably foreseeable that ANI would suffer
consequences in New York by Access publishing its home page.247Access
stated twice on its home page that it could help customers "across the
U.S." and it had signed up six New York subscribers.2 48 Access argued
that it had 7500 subscribers worldwide and only six in New York, which
constituted only 0.08% of its membership. 249 These six New York cus-
tomers contributed only $150 per month out of its monthly revenue of
$195,000.250 As a result, the court found that Access was trying to reach
a New York market. 25 1
With regard to the due process analysis, the court found that Access
had sufficient contacts with New York to demonstrate that it had pur-
posefully availed itself of that State's laws.25 2 Access had signed up six
New York subscribers to its service and derived $150 a month from
240. See id. at *7.
241. See id.
242. See id. at *3.
243. See id. at *1.
244. See id. at *1.
245. See id. at *2.
246. Id. at *3.
247. Id. at *4.
248. Id. at *4.
249. See id. at *2.
250. See id.
251. See id. at *4-5.
252. See id. at *5.
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those subscribers. 253 Moreover, the court assumed from the information
contained on Access' web site that it had mailed those six New York
customers a copy of its software package and a written copy of the ser-
vice agreement.2 14 From this information, the court determined that Ac-
cess had sought to serve a nationwide market which lent support to the
inference that the New York contacts were not "random or fortuitous.
255
Finally, the court found that the other portions of the due process analy-
sis did not prevent the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendants. 256 The
court found: (1) there was a nexus between Access' contacts with New
York residents and the cause of action; (2) that Access could have rea-
sonably foreseen. going to court in New York to defend itself from claims
arising from the mark; and (3) that other reasonableness factors did not
weigh against holding Access amenable to suit.
257
In distinguishing this opinion from the court's holding in Ben-
susan,258 the court found that Access derived "substantial revenue from
interstate commerce. ' 259 From the language on its home page, Access
made clear that it was able to serve customers across the United States. 260
By enrolling six New York customers in its service, sending them
software and agreements, providing them service, and receiving revenue
from them, Access had made it clear that it was doing business in New
York.2 6 1
g. Blumenthal v. Drudge
In another case from the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, Blumenthal v. Drudge,262 two White House employees
("Blumenthals") who were also District of Columbia residents, brought a
defamation action against the now infamous Internet reporter Matt
Drudge ("Drudge"), a State of California resident.2 63 In 1995 the defend-
ant Drudge created an electronic gossip column focusing on news from
Hollywood and Washington, D.C., known as the Drudge Report.264 Origi-
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See id. at *6-7.
258. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
259. American Network, 1997 WL 466507, at *8.
260. See id. at *8.
261. See id.
262. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
263. See id. at 46-47.
264. See id. at 47. Drudge's base of operations has been an office in Los Angeles,
California. The Drudge Report is available on the Internet at <http://
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nally, Drudge distributed his column by means of his web site and by e-
mail.2 65 Later, in late May or early June 1997, Drudge signed an agree-
ment to began distributing his column over America Online, an online
service provider.266 On August 10, 1997, Drudge wrote and transmitted
the edition of the Drudge Report that contained an allegedly defamatory
statement about the Blumenthals.2 67 After receiving a letter from the
Blumenthals' counsel the next day, Drudge retracted the story.268 The
Blumenthals then brought this defamation action.
In its analysis, the court relied primarily on the District of Colum-
bia's long-arm statute,269 but it also claimed that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion comported with due process. 270 Initially, the court found that
www.drudgereport.com>.
265. See id. at 47. At the web site, Drudge has a hyperlink link that caused the most
recently published addition to be displayed when activated. Drudge had also developed a
list of regular e-mail subscribers to whom he e-mailed each new addition of the Drudge
Report. By March 1995, Drudge had 1,000 regular e-mail subscribers. Plaintiffs alleged
that by 1997, Drudge had 85,000 subscribers to his e-mail service.
266. See id. America Online (or "AOL") claims more than nine million subscribers.
According to the written license agreement between Drudge and AOL, Drudge would re-
ceive a flat monthly royalty payment and Drudge managed the content of his column.
Drudge would then e-mail each new edition of the column to AOL, which would then
post the new edition on its service.
267. See id. Drudge transmitted the report from Los Angeles, California by e-mail to
his direct subscribers and by posting both a headline and the full text to his web site. He
then transmitted the text, but not the headline, to AOL which then made it available to its
subscribers.
268. See id. at 48. Drudge retracted the story through a special edition of the
Drudge Report posted on his web site and e-mailed to his subscribers on August 11,
1997. Drudge e-mailed the retraction to AOL on August 12, 1997 which then posted the
column to its service. Drudge later publicly apologized to the Blumenthals.
269. See id. at 53. The Blumenthals relied on the long-arm statute which conferred
jurisdiction over an entity causing tortious injury inside the District by an act or omission
outside the District. D.C. Code 13-423(a)(4). Drudge conceded that the allegedly defam-
atory edition of the Drudge Report was published outside the District and that the tortious
injury was caused within the District. Thus, the only question before the court was
whether Drudge regularly conducted business, derived substantial revenue, or engaged in
a persistent course of conduct in the District of Columbia as defined under the D.C.
Code. Id. at 53-54.
270. See id. at 57-58. The Court found that the exercise of jurisdiction was permis-
sible under the D.C. long-arm statute. Because the long-arm statute didn't reach the outer
limits of due process and that sufficient "plus factors" were met, the Court concluded
that there was also sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process. In its analysis, the
court applied the "plus factors" noted in Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Crane v. Carr, 814
F.2d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The court noted that these "plus factors" do not them-
selves confer jurisdiction, but rather the court relies on them to "filter out cases in which
the inforum impact is an isolated event and the defendant otherwise has no, or scant, af-
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Drudge's connections with the District were significant: Drudge's web
site was available to D.C. residents continuously, his e-mail list was sent
to D.C. residents, he solicited money from D.C. residents, he traveled to
D.C. twice for interviews to promote his publication, and he had regu-
larly been in contact with D.C. residents (via e-mail, telephone, and the
U.S. mail).271
The defendant claimed that his course of conduct was not persistent
and did not specifically target the District of Columbia.272 But the court
disagreed. First, examining the case law, the court found that Drudge's
web site was "interactive" rather than "passive. ' 273 Drudge had a web
site where users could add their e-mail addresses to the service subscrip-
tion list.274 Next, the court found that subject of the column was uniquely
targeted to the District.27 5 As the column dealt almost exclusively with
"inside the Beltway gossip and rumor," Drudge knew that the brunt of
his statement would be felt in the District of Columbia.27 6 Furthermore,
Drudge solicited money for his Report on his web page and received
money from fifteen D.C. residents. 277 Finally, the court found that
Drudge had other non-Internet related contacts that made the exercise of
jurisdiction reasonable. He had an interview with C-Span in Washington,
D.C., a nationally distributed cable show, and visited the District of Co-
lumbia on at least one other occasion.278 He also regularly maintained
contacts with D.C. residents as the source of his column's news. 279 As a
result, the court found that the Internet contacts coupled with the non-
Internet contacts made the exercise of jurisdiction permissible. 280
As the cases in this category illustrate, many courts are still uncer-
tain whether electronic contacts alone can provide the minimum contacts
filiation with the forum." Id. at 54 (quoting Crane, 814 F.2d at 763).
271. See id. at 54.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 55; see also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (comparing Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, 947 F. Supp. 1328,
1332-33 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (exercise of jurisdiction warranted where defendant's interactive
web site encouraged browsers to add their address to mailing lists that subscribed users to
the service) with Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299-300
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997) (passive web site which only posted
information for interested persons who may have accessed the web site not sufficient for
exercise of jurisdiction)).
274. See id. at 54.
275. See id. at 57.
276. Id. at 57.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id.
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necessary to exercise personal jurisdiction. The "something more" analy-
sis allows courts to place a finger on the scale in favor of the exercise of
jurisdiction. This "something more" analysis can quite rightly be seen as
the first timid steps into the world of Internet-related contacts.
As the courts have become more comfortable applying the minimum
contacts test of International Shoe to personal jurisdiction cases involving
the Internet, the opinions demonstrate a reduced reliance on these affiliat-
ing factors. For example, some courts needed very little additional sup-
porting evidence to find the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.28" ' Other
times, a court went to great lengths to ensure that the alleged harm in a
suit actually was felt in the district.282 Despite these often contradictory
results and the open split between the districts regarding the significance
of an electronic contact, courts are beginning to find their footing in
cases that involve internet-related contacts.283
The next section showcases a number of cases which have com-
pletely severed their reliance on the affiliating circumstances. Far from
being aberrational, these cases actually represent the "high-water" mark
of the Internet-related contact, much like the case of McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Insurance. Co. was the logical outer limits of the Court's doc-
trine under International Shoe.
3. Electronic Contacts Alone Supporting the Exercise of
Jurisdiction
a. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut's de-
cision in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.184 is a prime example
of a broader, more expansive framework for personal jurisdiction. In that
281. See Heroes, 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding that the web page with the
offending trademark and logo was "certainly a sustained contact with the District." Id. at
5.).
282. See Blumenthal, 992 F Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that the defendant had
a web site that was accessible in the District; that the defendant had visited the District
twice; that the defendant solicited money from individuals within the District; that the
defendant's column was sent to e-mail addresses in the district; and that the defendant
regularly contacted individuals by telephone, mail, and e-mail for the news that filled his
column).
283. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at 19-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (U.S. Magistrate Peck declining to follow the holdings in Maritz, Inc. v.
CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction
Set, Inc., 937 F Supp. 161 (D.Conn. 1996); and Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation, 958
F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
284. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
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case, Inset Systems, Inc. ("Inset"), a Connecticut corporation, sued In-
struction Set, Inc. ("ISI"), a Massachusetts company, for the latter's use
of "Inset" as its domain name (INSET.COM) and toll-free number (1-
800-US-INSET). 285 Inset alleged that Instruction's domain name and toll-
free number both constituted violations of federal and state trademark
law.286 The defendant ISI moved to dismiss the action for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction and improper venue. 287 The defendant asserted that it
did not have the requisite minimum contacts with Connecticut to make it
amenable to suit in Connecticut. 288 It had no offices in Connecticut nor
did it conduct businesses there on a regular basis. 289 Inset claimed that
ISI was using the Internet and the toll-free telephone number to try to
conduct business within the State of Connecticut. 29°
Turning to the State's long arm analysis, the court found that ISI
was soliciting business within Connecticut via its Internet advertisement
and its toll-free number.291 The court compared the near-constant availa-
bility of ISI's web site to a case in which a company placed "six
franchise ads over a six-month period in a newspaper whose circulation
clearly include[d] Connecticut. ' 292 With regard to the durability of an In-
ternet solicitation the court noted, "[U]nlike hard-copy advertise-
ments . . . which are often quickly disposed of and reach a limited num-
ber of potential customers, Internet advertisements are in electronic
printed form so that they can be accessed again and again by many more
potential consumers. ' 293
Turning to the minimum contacts analysis, the court found that ISI
"purposefully availed" itself of the privileges of conducting business
within the State of Connecticut through use of its web site and a toll-
number.294 The court compared ISI's solicitation of Connecticut residents
with a case in which a company had advertised in thirty (non-Intemet)
publications known to have been circulated in Connecticut over the
course of a year and a half, had delivered thirty allegedly infringing cata-
logs to Connecticut residents, and had made two sales to Connecticut re-
285. See id. at 162-163.
286. See id.
287. See id. at 162.
288. See id. at 164.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See id. (quoting McFaddin v. National Executive Search, Inc., 354 F. Supp.
1166, 1169 (D. Conn. 1973)).
293. Id.
294. See id.
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sidents which may or may not have been due to the solicitation.2 95 In its
comparison, the court noted that ISI had not only directed its advertising
activities to Connecticut but "to all states."2 96 In this case, ISI's solicita-
tion could not only reach 10,000 Connecticut residents with its advertis-
ing, but moreover this advertising was available to residents
"continuously." 297
Finally, the court examined the "fair play and substantial justice"
factors which might have worked to limit the exercise of jurisdiction.29 8
The court noted that travel from Natick, Massachusetts, to Hartford, Con-
necticut, was not so excessive as to render suit in the forum inconve-
nient.299 In its analysis, the court engaged in a limited "something more"
analysis by including mention of the 1-800 number on the web site.
Courts deciding this case today would almost certainly have inquired into
the actual sales or contacts with Connecticut residents. This does not
make this case an aberration. Rather, it marks an early leap of faith in
the application of the minimum contacts analysis to a case based on In-
ternet-related contacts.
b. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.
In Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.,3°° Maritz, Inc. ("Maritz") brought
this action against CyberGold, Inc. ("CyberGold") to enjoin the latter's
alleged trademark infringement.30' Maritz claimed that CyberGold's web
site contained an allegedly infringing trademark.302 Although CyberGold
disputed that it had the minimum contacts necessary for the court to ex-
ercise specific jurisdiction, the court disagreed. It noted that the disputed
web site was "continually accessible to every internet-connected com-
puter in Missouri. ' 30 3 Moreover, the web site was primarily used for ad-
vertising and any one of 12,000 Internet users in Missouri could access
the site.3°4
In the long-arm portion of the analysis, Maritz suggested that the
court could exercise jurisdiction using the "transaction of any business"
295. See id. (citing Whelen Engineering Co. v. Tomar Electrics, 672 F Supp. 659
(D. Conn. 1987).
296. See id. at 165.
297. See id.
298. See id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)).
299. See id.
300. 947 F Supp. 1328 (1996).
301. See id. at 1329
302. See id. at 1330.
303. See id.
304. See id.
[Vol. 23
SMALL WORLD
requirement. 305 CyberGold's use of its web site to advertise its business,
it argued, was analogous to the use of mass mailings to advertise a busi-
ness.3°6 The court disagreed.307 Such a comparison was unnecessary as
the presence of the web site satisfied the "commission of a tortious act"
provision of Missouri's long-arm statute.308 Even assuming the allegedly
infringing activities were wholly outside of Missouri, the court con-
cluded, the activities produced a tortious effect in Missouri.3°9
Turning to the due process analysis, the court explained the unique
properties exhibited by Internet communications and disavowed any com-
parisons to more traditional forms of media.310 The court explained how
the due process standards for mail or the telephone were not applicable
to Internet communications. 31' While telephone numbers (such as a toll-
free number) still relied on print media to advertise its existence, Internet
web sites were "a tremendously more efficient, quicker, and vast means
of reaching a global audience. ' 31 2 Unlike the limited information pro-
vided by toll-free numbers, Internet web sites offered a more comprehen-
sive level of information exchange, including downloading and print-
ing.313 In addition, once an Internet web site had been published, anyone
could find its location using a simple search. 314
In its five-part analysis of minimum contacts, the court rejected
CyberGold's characterization of its activities as "merely maintaining a
"passive website. ' ' 315 First, the court found that CyberGold used its web
site to attract business to its service, "regardless of [the user's] geo-
graphic location. ' 316 CyberGold "consciously decided to transmit adver-
305. See id at 1331.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. See id.
310. See id. at 1332.
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 1333. CyberGold operated a web site located at <http://
www.cybergold.com>. The website provided information about CyberGold's upcoming
service which included maintaining a mailing list of Internet users (no geographic restric-
tions on membership were mentioned). An Internet user who wanted to participate in the
service would provide CyberGold with his or her particular areas of interest. CyberGold
would then provide the user with a personal electronic mailbox and would forward to the
user advertisements that match the users' interests. CyberGold would then charge adver-
tisers for access to the Internet users on its mailing list. At the time of the suit,
CyberGold's service was not yet in operation, but it was soliciting customers. Id. at 1330.
316. Id. at 1333.
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tising information to all internet users, knowing that such information
[would] be transmitted globally. ' 31 7 Secondly, based on the quantity of
contacts with the State, the court found that CyberGold used its web site
as a promotional tool to solicit Missouri Internet users. 318 CyberGold
transmitted information regarding its web site to Missouri 131 times
since the site became operational. 31 9 Thirdly, the cause of action arose
out of the defendant's allegedly infringing activities. The defendant was
using its web site to promote its upcoming service, and that web site
contained the allegedly infringing trademark. 320 Finally, the court con-
cluded that CyberGold, based on its Internet activities, should have "rea-
sonably anticipate[d] the possibility of being haled into court [in Mis-
souri]." ' 321 Maritz and the State of Missouri had an interest in resolving
the case in the State. Moreover, CyberGold did not demonstrate that it
would be burdened by having to defend in Missouri.3 22
c. State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.
In State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.,323 the Minnesota Attorney
General's office sued the provider of an online wagering service, alleging
that it engaged in deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and con-
sumer fraud when it asserted that online gambling was "legal" in
Minnesota. 32 4
Granite Gate Resorts, Inc. ("Granite Gate") was a Nevada corpora-
tion doing business as On Ramp, an Internet advertising service provid-
ing Nevada tourism information. 325 Among the advertisers on this Nevada
site was WagerNet, an online wagering service. 326 Upon visiting the
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. See id. The court here is using the converse of the traditional "pull" model of
web sites. See Mark Eckenwiler, Criminal Law and the Internet, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 23,
1995, at S32. In that model, information passively resides on a web site until accessed by
a user. Here, the Missouri court used the converse theory to demonstrate that CyberGold
consciously transmitted information from its California server to Missouri 131 times. See
id.
320. See id.
321. Id. at 1334.
322. See id.
323. No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431 (Minn. Ramsey County District Ct. Dec.
11, 1996), aff'd, 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), appeal granted, No. C6-97-89,
1997 Minn. LEXIS 829 (Minn. Oct. 31, 1997), aff'd by an equally divided court, 576
N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998).
324. Granite Gate, 568 N.W.2d at 717.
325. See id. On Ramp's site was located at <http://www.vegas.com>.
326. See id.
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WagerNet home page, a user would enter his or her name into a mailing
list or use a toll-free number (or a Nevada telephone number) to obtain
information about the soon-to-be-available wagering service.327 A linked
web page listed the terms and conditions of becoming a member, and
stated that any claim against WagerNet by a customer must be brought
before a Belizian court. 328
In July 1995, an investigator from the Minnesota Attorney General's
office called the toll-free number listed on the On Ramp site, and ex-
pressed an interest in subscribing to the online gambling service.329 An
On Ramp employee told the investigator to call the Nevada number, the
same one listed on the WagerNet site.330 At that number, an officer of
WagerNet told the investigator that the gambling service was "legal" and
would be up and running in a few months. 3 1 Shortly thereafter, the At-
torney General's office filed suit against Granite Gate and its related
companies for misrepresenting that online gambling was lawful in Min-
nesota.332 Thereafter, in October 1995, the investigator subscribed to the
WagerNet mailing list and received an online confirmation. 333
The defendant moved for dismissal, asserting lack of personal juris-
diction.334 The district court granted limited discovery to determine the
quantity and quality of Granite Gate's contacts with the State of Minne-
sota.335 Subsequently, the defendant refused to produce the names of the
persons on the WagerNet mailing list, claiming that the information was
the sole property of a Belizian corporation. 336 As a sanction, the trial
court found that the mailing list contained at least one Minnesota resi-
dent,337 and eventually denied Granite Gate's motion to dismiss. 338 On ap-
peal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the district
court. In affirming, the appeals court applied a five-factor minimum con-
327. See id. A note on the web page also advised users to consult with local author-
ities regarding restrictions on offshore sports betting by telephone before registering with
WagerNet. See id.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. Id. A Granite Gate agent did not request the caller's home state to confirm
whether online gambling was in fact "legal" in that jurisdiction. See id.
332. See id.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. See id.
336. See id. at 717-18.
337. See id. at 718.
338. See id.
1999]
174 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
tacts test formulated by the Minnesota Supreme Court339 and determined
that the totality of the evidence weighed in favor of asserting personal ju-
risdiction over Granite Gate.34°
With regard to the quantity of contacts, the court followed the
United States district court's reasoning in Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold,
Inc. 341. That court found that each time a Missouri user accessed defend-
ant's web site in California, it was conversely a transmission of informa-
tion into the State of Missouri.342 Similarly, the Granite Gate court of ap-
peals cited with approval the findings of the Minnesota district court.
Specifically, that court found that: (1) Minnesota computers had indeed
accessed Granite Gate's web site, (2) during a two week period in 1996
at least 248 Minnesota computers accessed and received transmissions
from Granite Gate's web site, (3) computers located in Minnesota were
among the 500 most frequent accessors of Granite Gate's web site, (4)
persons throughout the United States and Minnesota called Granite Gate's
telephone numbers advertised on its web site, and (5) the WagerNet mail-
ing list contained the name and address of at least one Minnesota
resident.343
Next, in its assessment of the quality of Granite Gate's contacts with
Minnesota, the court noted that Granite Gate's web site amounted to ad-
vertising in Minnesota, thus subjecting them to suit in that state.344 Al-
though Granite Gate argued that it had not actively solicited business in
Minnesota, the court noted that a web site demonstrated an affirmative
intent to solicit business from all Internet users.3 45 This intent to serve a
broad geographic market was buttressed by the WagerNet site itself
which advertised that it was "open to International markets. ' 346 Moreo-
ver, the fact that WagerNet had paid for advertising in English on an
American commercial web site and included a toll-free number indicated
339. See id. (citing Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717, 719-20 (Minn.
1985)). The five factors included: "(1) the quantity of the defendant's contacts; (2) the
nature and quality of the defendant's contacts; (3) the connection between the cause of
action and the defendant's contacts; (4) the state's interest in providing a forum; and (5)
the convenience of the parties." Id.; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 476-77 (1985) (discussing the "fair play and substantial justice" factors).
340. Id. at 721 (holding that the defendants "demonstrated a clear intent to solicit
business from markets that include[d] Minnesota" by advertising their service on the In-
ternet and soliciting business from Minnesota residents).
341. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
342. Granite Gate, 568 N.W.2d at 719 (citing Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333).
343. See id. at 718-19.
344. See id. at 719-20.
345. See id. at 720.
346. Id.
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an intent to reach out to and solicit business from the American
market. 3 47
Thirdly, the court found that the cause of action arose from Granite
Gate's contacts with Minnesota, the forum state. As the misleading ad-
vertisement (stating that online gambling was "legal" in Minnesota) was
the source of the consumer protection action, and that advertisement was
accessible in Minnesota, the court claimed the nexus requirement was
satisfied.3 48 In the fourth factor of the minimum contacts test, the court
found that Minnesota had an interest in regulating gambling within its
state and enforcing consumer protection laws. 349 Finally, with regard to
the convenience of the parties, the court noted that Granite Gate would
not be inconvenienced by defending itself in Minnesota. As the company
itself noted on its web site, Granite Gate reserved the right to sue the
customers of WagerNet in either the customer's home forum or in Be-
lize. 350 Granite Gate argued that this fact alone should not be determina-
tive. 351 While the court of appeals agreed, it also found that the district
court did not rely on this fact alone to determine that Granite Gate would
not be inconvenienced by defending suit in Minnesota.35 2
PART V: PURPOSEFUL AVAILMENT VS. REASONABLENESS
A. Serving the Global Marketplace
As the cases above indicate, electronic media, known collectively as
the Internet, has given the individual an almost incomprehensible power
to communicate with a potential audience of millions. The Internet has
also reduced the cost and convenience of communicating with a world-
wide audience to virtually nil. Yet, this medium may carry with it the
seeds of its own demise. While an individual may now be able to contact
millions of people with a minimal investment, that same individual may
now unwittingly expose himself to the laws of countries around the
world. This puzzle is forcing courts to re-examine the touchstones of ju-
risdictional fairness. It also seems to have stirred up the age-old tug-of-
war built into the personal jurisdiction analysis between the defendant's
interest in determining in which forums he may be liable to suit and the
legal system's interest in determining the most convenient forum for the
suit. Each interest presents its own difficulties.
347. See id.
348. See id. at 720-21.
349. See id. at 721.
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. See id.
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With regard to electronic contacts and the minimum contacts analy-
sis, the question becomes even more difficult. On a web site advertising
a product, for example, a court may choose one of three paths. First, a
court may decide that a web site will always serve as a minimum contact
in any forum able to receive the message. This path would mean essen-
tially world-wide personal jurisdiction. Realistically, it would eviscerate
the protections to the defendant inherent in the minimum contacts doc-
trine. This path unfairly favors the interests of forum citizens over the in-
terests of the likely defendant. Conversely, a court may also come to the
opposite conclusion-that a web site might never serve as a minimum
contact necessary for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. In this view, a
defendant would be permitted to conduct business around the world
while never being forced to defend in any jurisdiction other than its own.
This path would present a major problem to individuals who had been
injured by the defendant, but could not afford to pursue their claims in a
distant forum. This option unfairly favors the interests of the defendant
over the interests of forum citizens. Finally, there is the middle path-the
case-by-case assessment. This is the path to which the courts have
steered since the Supreme Court declared in International Shoe that the
test for personal jurisdiction cannot be simply "mechanical or quantita-
tive."' 353 This is the path that respects existing precedent, but incorporates
the changing notions of fairness to the defendant.
As has already been stated, existing personal jurisdiction precedent
is still viable and provides a worthwhile model for the present-day analy-
sis. Yet, the delicate balance of the minimum contacts analysis is shifting
in very important ways and courts and practitioners should take note of
two very important changes. First, courts must realize that the "pur-
poseful availment" requirement first articulated in Hanson v. Denckla'1
4
might not present such a high hurdle in the information age. Secondly,
and more importantly, the balance of jurisdictional analysis will increas-
ingly shift to the second part of the due process standard-whether the
exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of "fair play
and substantial justice." The Internet is expanding the notion of what
constitutes a "minimum contact" within the Supreme Court's analytical
framework. As a result, courts will begin to measure whether the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction is fair to the defendant based on the "other
factors" noted in such cases as Burger King v. Rudzewicz.355 While "pur-
poseful availment" is still a viable requirement to be strongly considered
353. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
354. 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958).
355. 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985).
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in any due process analysis, its use as a leading indicator will be greatly
diminished during the information age.
The modem analysis for personal jurisdiction has undergone many
alterations over the years as courts around the world seek to be fair to
defendants in the face of technological change. The United States is a
perfect example of how courts have adjusted their doctrines to fit with
reality. The Supreme Court's decision in Hanson v. Denckla was a tre-
mendous leap forward for the rights of defendants, requiring courts to in-
quire about the activities of the individual and the convenience of the fo-
rum. At that time, no one could have foreseen the changes that would
develop in communications, travel and commerce. Yet, the purposeful
availment standard has served courts well over the years, distinguishing
between individuals who were only tangentially connected to the forum
and those that had deliberately sought to serve its citizens. This is an im-
portant distinction because, as I point out in Part VI, it is still possible to
serve a local market over the Internet.
With the advent of the Internet, it is as easy to serve customers
around the world as it is to serve customers around the block. Make no
mistake, "minimum contacts" and the "purposeful availment" standard
are still viable markers when gauging whether the exercise of jurisdiction
comports with due process. Yet, the minimum contacts requirement is be-
coming a smaller hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome. And for some inten-
tional torts, this hurdle is nothing more than a speed bump.
By way of example, consider the diminishing importance of the
minimum contacts standard based on two previously mentioned cases,
Cybersell, Inc. 35 6 and Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.357 In Cybersell, the
Ninth Circuit found that Cybersell Florida had not "purposefully
availed" itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Arizona and
proceeded no further in the analysis.358 In this trademark infringement ac-
tion, two Florida residents set up a consulting business to help other
businesses market products on the web. As part of their marketing effort,
they used a web site. The web site contained the allegedly infringing
trademark and a local Orlando, Florida, telephone number as well as a
link by which customers could e-mail the two defendants with questions.
In finding that Cybersell Florida had not purposefully availed itself
of the laws of Arizona, the Ninth Circuit found it significant that there
was no evidence adduced which showed any contacts with Arizona re-
sidents, other than the plaintiffs. 359 Although Cybersell Florida's web site
356. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
357. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
358. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d at 419.
359. See id.
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was accessible in Arizona, the defendants closed no deals, signed no con-
tracts, received no telephone calls, sent no e-mail messages, and earned
no income from Arizona. As a result, the court found that the defendants
had made no effort to market to Arizona. Yet these factors are quite sus-
pect when determining whether the defendants had "purposefully
availed" themselves of the benefits and protections of the laws of Ari-
zona. Many of these contacts, such as a telephone call or e-mail from
Arizona by a prospective client, would have exclusively been within the
control of a prospective client who might have contacted the defendants.
These type of activities seem to be the type of unilateral activities which
the court in Hanson v. Denckla36° decided could not incur jurisdiction.
Compare that result with the results in Maritz.361 In that trademark
infringement action, the court found that the California defendant had
"purposefully availed" itself of the benefits and privileges of the laws of
Missouri. 362 The source of the trademark infringement was the defend-
ant's web site. CyberGold had no businesses, offices, or employees in
Missouri, and the only connection with the state was the fact that its web
site was accessible there.363 While the defendants did not have a toll-free
number, they did have a link by which subscribers could contact the de-
fendants and get more information about its soon-to-be-operational ser-
vice. 364 The court also found it significant that there were 12,000 persons
in Missouri with Internet access, and that Internet users from Missouri
had accessed the defendant's web site 131 times since it became opera-
tional. 365 In its opinion, the court emphasized the durable nature of an In-
ternet advertisement, and how comparisons to traditional forms of media
were less than satisfactory. 366
When these two cases are boiled down to their essentials, it appears
that the different results were determined by whether anyone from the fo-
rum state answered the web advertisement. If the defendants in Cybersell
had indeed received any inquiries regarding its business from Arizona,
that case may have been resolved entirely differently. More perplexing is
the status of unilateral contacts. The Supreme Court made it clear that
the plaintiff or a third party, by his actions, cannot render the defendant
liable to suit.367 Rather it must be the activities of the defendant which
360. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
361. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
362. Id. at 1334.
363. Id. at 1330.
364. Id. at 1329.
365. See id. at 1331.
366. See id. at 1332.
367. Hanson v. Deckela, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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makes the contact with the forum. In each of these cases, the court's in-
quiry actually revolved around who answered the defendant's advertise-
ment and what the defendant did with that information. The courts that
have found the exercise of jurisdiction based on web contacts seem to
emphasize the communicative power of the medium more so than those
that do not.368
Some commentators have suggested that cases such as Inset, Maritz,
and Granite Gate are an aberration, well outside the boundaries of estab-
lished personal jurisdiction practice.3 69 But upon closer examination, they
are consistent with the ever-developing laws regarding personal jurisdic-
tion and the Internet. In these cases, one can see that the defendants were
seeking to serve a national or even international clientele. For example,
while the court in Inset may not have made all the possible inquiries into
the electronic contacts with the forum state (e.g., how many Connecticut
citizens were accessing the Massachusetts company's web site, did the
defendant have any Connecticut customers, etc.), the defendant was look-
ing to sell products to a larger audience than simply Massachusetts, as
evidenced by the toll-free number. The same held true in the Maritz deci-
sion. In that case, the defendant's business was to provide access to a
distributed message database-a service that could be provided to and
purchased by anyone in the world. Similarly, in Granite Gate, the de-
fendants sought to offer a betting service to a wide audience. This ser-
vice was not confined by the limitations of a state's or country's bounda-
ries. As the court found, the defendants were seeking to market their
service to "[i]nternational markets." 370
But in these cases, as in all personal jurisdiction analyses, this was
not the end of the due process inquiry. Courts must also weigh the rea-
sonableness of exercising jurisdiction. The Inset decision is a good exam-
ple of a case in which the minimum contacts analysis and the reasonable-
368. Some courts placed strong emphasis on how many users from the forum in
question accessed the defendant's web site. See id. at 1333 (finding Missouri users had
accessed defendant's web site 131 times); see also State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.,
568 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding at least 248 Minnesota computers
accessed defendant's web site during a two-week period and that computers in Minnesota
were among the most frequent users of defendant's service). Other courts placed strong
emphasis on the pervasiveness and durability of the medium. See Inset Systems, Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D.Conn. 1996) (finding that once an In-
ternet advertisement is posted, it can be accessed again and again by potential customers).
369. See David L. Stott, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The Con-
stitutional Boundary of Minimum Contacts Limited to a Web Site, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 819, 844-52 (1997) (finding that the court should not have exer-
cised jurisdiction in Inset and Maritz because the web sites were "passive").
370. Granite Gate, 568 N.W.2d at 720.
1999l
180 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE
ness inquiry both strongly support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. In
its due process analysis, the Inset court properly noted that the minimum
requirements of "fair play and substantial justice" could still work to de-
feat the reasonable exercise of jurisdiction even if there were "minimum
contacts" with the forum state.37' As the distance between Connecticut
and Massachusetts was minimal, the court found that the finding of mini-
mum contacts was in line with "notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice. ' 372 But, consider a case in which the minimum contact factors
pointed to the reasonable exercise of jurisdiction and the "fair play and
substantial justice" factors did not. What would happen then? As sug-
gested in the next section, the Internet is raising these questions with in-
creasing frequency.
B. The Shift to Reasonableness
To understand the push towards reasonableness is to understand the
underlying forces driving this sea change in personal jurisdiction analy-
sis. Many individuals will be making their first online purchases over the
next few years. With the Internet, individuals can communicate and con-
duct commerce with people they have never seen and in places they have
never been. And unlike a fleeting advertisement in a trade publication
that happens to circulate in a state or country, this advertisement will run
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Paradoxically, courts are be-
ing asked to consider whether defendants can be everywhere and no-
where at once. Can a court reasonably acknowledge that a persistent,
continuous advertising campaign is being run in their state or country by
a foreign entity, yet deny its own residents the power to protect them-
selves in their own court system? While these questions may sound
novel, they are not. In fact, the only new fact in this equation is the me-
dium itself.
Courts across the country and around the world have both addressed
and successfully surmounted these same situations numerous times. The
only real difference is that virtually every Internet case presents a unique
case near the outermost borders of the due process analysis. As states
and countries become more comfortable with the Internet, these sover-
eign entities will increasingly find that electronic contacts meet the re-
371. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D.Conn.
1996) (finding advertisement could reach at least 10,000 users in Connecticut alone and
that an Internet advertisements could be accessed over and over by potential customers);
see also Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1332 (finding that there were 12,000 Internet users alone
in Missouri and that an Internet advertisement does not rely on any other forms of media
for its effectiveness).
372. Inset, 937 F. Supp at 164.
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quirement for minimum contacts. Without adequate protections, however,
defendants will most certainly suffer from this rapid expansion of the
definition of minimum contacts. However, the due process analysis has
provided the defendant protection under this exact scenario. The second
half of the due process analysis, whether the exercise of jurisdiction com-
ports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," pro-
vides courts with the power to protect a defendant in cases where he or
she may have the requisite minimum contacts, but the exercise of juris-
diction would not be reasonable.
Recently, a United States District Court case was decided in the
Northern District of California which underscores this exact approach to
the personal jurisdiction analysis. In Expert Pages v. Buckalew, 373 the
plaintiff ("Expert Pages"), a California corporation, brought an action in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
against the defendant Jason Buckalew ("Buckalew"), a Virginia resident,
for copyright infringement, unfair trade practices, breach of contract, tres-
pass, and misappropriation. 374 Expert Pages was in the business of adver-
tising litigation-related services on its web site.375 On this site, consul-
tants and expert witnesses paid the plaintiff a fee to be listed on the web
site. In February 1997, Expert pages registered a copyright for its
database. 376 The defendant, whom the court described as a "young
adult, ' 3 77 created a web site that provided similar information to that in-
cluded on Expert Pages' site.378 The complaint alleged that Buckalew vi-
olated Expert Pages' copyright by making an unauthorized copy of the
website for the purpose of sending e-mail messages to the persons who
advertised on the site.379 The e-mail messages allegedly disparaged Ex-
pert Pages and offered Buckalew's service as an alternative. 380 The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.381 In
its analysis, the court found that Buckalew had the requisite minimum
contacts with California, but that the factors of "reasonableness" mili-
tated against exercising jurisdiction over Buckalew and the motion to dis-
miss was granted. 382
373. Expert Pages v. Buckalew, 1997 WL 488011 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 6, 1997).
374. See id. at *1.
375. See id.
376. See id.
377. Id.
378. See id.
379. See id.
380. See id.
381. See id.
382. See id. at *5.
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In its analysis, the court found that Buckalew had minimum contacts
with California because his actions were calculated to cause injury to a
California company.383 Under a Caldera-type analysis, the court found
that Buckalew had directed his actions at the State, 385 but, the court also
found that the exercise of jurisdiction must accord with the reasonable-
ness factors inherent in a due process analysis. 386 And these factors,
weighted equally, did not favor the exercise of jurisdiction.
First, the court found that Buckalew had purposefully availed him-
self of the benefits and protections of California's laws, but only to "a
very small extent. ' 387 However, the court found that the burden on Buck-
alew to defend in California against such a suit would be very high.
388
The court found that while Buckalew did have minimum contacts with
California, those contacts were "barely greater than the constitutional
threshold. ' 389 Moreover, the exercise of jurisdiction in this case would
likely be determinative, because either party would face a substantial bur-
den to litigate outside of its home jurisdiction.390 As a result, the court
found that Expert Pages, as a successful web business, was more capable
of prosecuting an action in Virginia than Buckalew would be in Califor-
nia.39' The court found that if the court would exercise jurisdiction,
Buckalew would be "deprived of an opportunity to defend himself.
392
As Buckalew's contact with California was fairly limited, the court held
that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable and granted his
motion to dismiss. 393
This case, once again, raises the specter of that age-old debate in
personal jurisdiction analysis regarding the power of the individual to
choose where he is amenable to suit (purposefulness) and the forum's
383. See id. at *2.
384. Cader v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
385. Expert Pages, 1997 WL 488011 at *3.
386. See id at *2. These seven factors for evaluating reasonableness included: "1)
the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the forum state's affairs; 2) the
burden on the defendant; 3) conflicts of law between the forum and defendant's home ju-
risdiction; 4) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute; 5) the most efficient judicial
resolution of the dispute; 6) the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and
7) the existence of an alternative forum." Id. (citing Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d
617, 623 (9th Cir. 1991)).
387. Expert Pages, 1997 WL 488011 at *3.
388. See id. at *4.
389. Id.
390. See id.
391. See id.
392. Id. at *5.
393. See id.
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power to protect its residents (reasonableness). And, as this case demon-
strates, the winner still remains to be determined.
PART VI: SERVING THE LOCAL MARKET
Based on the aforementioned discussion, it may now appear that ad-
vertising on the Internet makes a business or individual amenable to ser-
vice anywhere that their advertisement may reach. This assumption is
simply untrue.
Compare a case like Bensusan394 with a case like Zippo.395 Both are
trademark infringement suits. In Bensusan, the defendant King ran an en-
tirely local operation in Columbia, Missouri, albeit over the Internet.396
Although the court found that King published a web site which adver-
tised his jazz club and that web site was accessible in New York, the
defendant had not specifically targeted New York for business.397 While
the district court relied on the New York long-arm statute for much of its
analysis, it did apply the due process analysis.3 98 The court found that
King had not purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections
of operating a business in New York.399 This was evident from numerous
facts both on and off the web site. First, the web site contained a dis-
claimer that King's club should not be confused with "The Blue Note"
in New York.4°° Next, the web site only had a local Missouri phone num-
ber.4°1 Furthermore, King had a ticketing policy which was targeted at lo-
cal residents.402 If a customer wanted to purchase tickets to a show at
King's club, he would have to come to the club himself because King
did not mail tickets out.40 3 Finally, the court found that 99 percent of
King's revenue was derived from local residents of Columbia, Mis-
souri.4 As a result, King was able to demonstrate, through his web site
and his administrative policies, his deliberate and unambiguous attempt
to market his services only to local residents °5
394. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
395. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
396. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp at 300.
397. See id. at 299.
398. See id. at 300-1.
399. See id. at 301.
400. See id. at 297-98.
401. See id. at 299.
402. See id.
403. See id.
404. See id. at 300.
405. See id. at 299.
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In Zippo, on the other hand, Dot Com clearly attempted to market
its service over the Internet using its web site. The service was an en-
tirely web-based service that reached out across the country and quite
possibly around the world.40 6 Dot Corn demonstrated its willingness to
take subscribers wherever they were to be found.40 7 Although the court
used a "something more" analysis in its opinion, finding that Dot Corn
had 3,000 customers in Pennsylvania and that it had contracted with
three Pennsylvania Internet Service Providers, there was little doubt that
it was a business relying on interstate commerce.
As these cases illustrate, it is quite possible for an individual to run
a local business, even if its web site is accessible in almost every juris-
diction around the world. This fact is not complicated in the least bit by
an "interactive" web site. Even if the site contains an interactive link
such as that described as the middle group of the three category models
proposed in Zippo,4°8 such a link does not immediately confer worldwide
jurisdiction.
Interactive links are the one true danger of this medium. However,
the importance of an automatic link cannot be underemphasized enough.
In these cases, courts should ask questions that give determinative an-
swers: what is the cause of action alleged and whom did the defendant
seek to serve or reach with its web site or Internet contact? Many times
the answer is inherent in the nature of the business advertised.
In Maritz and Zippo, the business was primarily dependent upon the
web site for advertising a nationwide or worldwide service. The interac-
tive web site was used to automatically solicit and add customers to its
service. The interactive nature of the web site did not make these ser-
vices national or international-it was the nature of the service offered.
Compare this result with cases such as Bensusan and Cybersell. In each
of these cases, an interactive link adding the user's name to a mailing list
may have tilted the court towards exercising jurisdiction, but it probably
would not have been determinative. The reason is that these were inher-
ently local services which could have only been provided locally. The
presence of the Internet did not change that character one bit.
It is also noteworthy to consider what might have happened in some
of the cases if the facts were changed slightly. In the Cybersell case, it is
easy to imagine the defendants being held amenable to service in Ari-
zona with a slight change of facts. Suppose Cybersell Florida put a toll-
406. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (W.D.Pa.
1997).
407. See id. Dot Corn did not place any restrictions on who could register at the
site.
408. See id. at 1124.
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free number on their web site. Furthermore, suppose the defendants had
been in business a little longer and had begun to receive calls and accept
business from Arizona residents. At that point, it would be hard to argue
that the defendants had not indeed availed themselves of the privilege of
doing business in Arizona. Yet, the only difference would have been that
Arizona residents had begun to respond to the advertisement which had
been accessible to them. The defendant's would not have changed their
marketing strategy. Instead, they would have been in business long
enough to have had such a business opportunity. Similarly, in Hearst v.
Goldberger,4°9 the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York noted ironically that if Hearst had just waited until the
defendant had begun to conduct business in the State of New York, the
court would have likely been able to exercise jurisdiction based on the
defendant's web site.410
Based on the personal jurisdiction cases which have been decided
by United States courts to date, some patterns appear to be emerging
with regard to the Internet. These decisions point to the likely conclusion
that if an individual advertises a service on the Internet, that individual
should have a fairly good idea of the market he seeks to serve-either
local or national. If an individual seeks to serve a local market, that indi-
vidual's web site and policies should reflect that decision. While a third
party or a potential plaintiff may not unilaterally cause an individual to
be amenable to jurisdiction in a forum, those activities may be highly in-
dicative. If an individual starts out serving a local market and then be-
gins to receive offers to do business in another jurisdiction, the individual
should take care that his activites are lawful in the other jurisdiction. An-
cillary spillover into the nationwide or worldwide market might well lead
to the exercise of national or even international personal jurisdiction, re-
gardless of deliberate intent.
409. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y 1997).
410. See id. at *11. In that case the court held that it could not exercise jurisdiction
over the defendant who had placed a web site advertising law office infrastructure ser-
vices using the domain name "ESQUIRE.COM" in violation of the plaintiff's trademark.
The defendant resided in New Jersey and worked in Philadelphia. The defendant's service
was not yet up and running at the time of the suit. The web site just advertised a soon-to-
be-offered service. The court found that it could not exercise jurisdiction under any of the
New York long-arm statutes which included transacting business in the state of New
York. The court noted, "It appears that Hearst has placed itself in a "Catch 22" situation.
If Hearst had waited until Goldberger contracted to sell his attorney support services to
New Yorkers, long-arm jurisdiction likely would have been appropriate .... But if Hearst
had waited, it would have been faced with laches-type defenses and possible greater harm
to its ESQUIRE trademark." Id. (citation omitted).
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PART VII: CONCLUSION
With all the changes that the multifaceted Internet has brought, it
still has not altered the standards or definitions of the personal jurisdic-
tion analysis. The traditional model of personal jurisdiction extending
from International Shoe is still intact. Those precedents are still good
law, and should successfully guide courts well into the next century. On
the other hand, the Internet is pushing the envelope with regard to the
outermost boundaries of personal jurisdiction. More specifically, the In-
ternet is challenging an individual's ability to maintain careful control
over where his activities may render him amenable to personal jurisdic-
tion. With increasing frequency, courts are being faced with factual situa-
tions where a defendant's contacts with the forum state meet the require-
ments of "minimum contacts," yet do not comport with traditional
notions of "fair play and substantial justice" inherent in the due process
analysis (or the international standard of reasonableness). Consequently,
cases involving the Internet will increase pressure on this second prong
of the due process analysis and courts should use this prong to success-
fully protect defendants.
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